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Unionists viewed the Union as the appropriate choice for protecting their property, 
including their slaves. Slavery in Kentucky revolved around small farms with few slaves 
rather than the predominant plantation culture of the cotton South. Kentucky had a large 
population consisting of small farmers, specifically in the East, who had no economic 
interest in slavery.  Despite an affinity for slavery, Kentucky politics typically followed 
the ideals of Henry Clay concerning compromise and neutrality. This meant Kentucky 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION: HISTORIOGRAPHY OF KENTYCKY 
 
In December 1861, during the winter of secession, Robert J. Breckinridge, a 
prominent Republican and Unionist from Kentucky, wrote a series of pamphlets 
discussing the importance of remaining in the Union and resisting the urge to secede. 
“The profitable continuance of negro slavery anywhere on this continent,” he wrote, “and 
its continuance at all in the Border Slave States, depends absolutely upon the existence of 
a common national government embracing both the Free States and the Slave States.” 
Breckinridge affirmed that our “political system, affords not only the highest, but the 
only effectual protection for interests that are local and exceptional-and at the same time 
out of sympathy with the general judgment of mankind.” He concluded that “of all 
possible interests, that of the owners of slaves, in a free country stands most in need of 
the protection of such a system.” Breckinridge attempted to encourage members of 
Kentucky to remain in the Union in order to protect their financial interests. According to 
Breckinridge, the Union provided the best option for property protection for 
Kentuckians.
1
  
                                                          
1
 John C. Breckinridge, The Civil War: Its Nature and End (Cincinnati: Office of the Danville 
Review, 1861), 645-646. 
2 
 
Unionists like Breckinridge were among those vying for Kentucky’s loyalty 
during the secession crisis. With the threat of war looming, Kentucky faced a dilemma: 
should Kentucky remain in the Union or secede with other slave states? Kentuckians 
needed to decide which government would best protect their economic interests. 
Kentuckians also debated which side would share the moderate political views promoted 
for much of the past half-century by Henry Clay, the statesman from Kentucky. 
Kentucky, unlike other border states, did not immediately align with northern or southern 
counterparts; instead Kentuckians remained uniquely moderate in their politics.  
Historical writings dating to 1885 give an account of the Civil War, its statistics, 
and the aftermath in Kentucky but fail to mention Kentucky’s’ unique role during the 
secession crisis. From 1885 to 1950 most historians were uniform in their observations. 
They described events but did not give a critical analysis of why the circumstances in 
Kentucky were different than other states. Most leave out the efforts made to change 
political opinion in Kentucky during the secession crisis or the reason for its vote for 
neutrality.  The exception is E. Merton Coulter’s The Civil War and Readjustment in 
Kentucky (1926).
2
  
Coulter’s interpretation of political events in Kentucky proved to be more 
advanced than popular at the time. He was able to capture the unique position of 
Kentucky before, during, and after the war. In chapter two, Coulter points out the difficult 
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 Zachary F. Smith, The History of Kentucky (Louisville and Chicago, 1885); W. H. Perrin, J.H. 
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questions before the state in 1860-1861. In the next five chapters, he shows how the state 
adopted neutrality, which policies seriously affected Southern trade, the difficulty of 
maintaining a neutral position, the eventual abandonment of that position, and how Union 
sympathizers expelled the Confederates. He presents the case that Kentucky never whole-
heartedly made up its mind. Kentucky was drawn to the South by personal and social ties. 
It had a growing commerce with the Gulf States, but most importantly a fear for the 
safety of the institution of slavery. Coulter believed Kentucky held the same ties to 
slavery, which existed in its more fertile agricultural counties, as deep southern states.  
He also shows how the cities along the Ohio border had a strong northern tie because of 
their dependence on trade.
3
 Coulter’s thesis is problematic because he does not give 
proper significance to the slave trade. Kentucky’s use of slavery was broader than he 
mentioned.  
The next grouping of literature for Kentucky is between 1955 and 1997. During 
this time historians produced several books written on the history of Kentucky or 
President Abraham Lincoln’s relationship with the state and how it shaped his beliefs. 
Although valid and insightful, these works did not specifically address the tensions and 
issues with the election of 1860 or neutrality during the secession crisis.
4
 However the 
latest grouping of literature, from 2000 to the present, attempts to tackle these issues.  
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Kent Masterson Brown, in the introduction of Civil War in Kentucky: Battle for 
the Bluegrass State, wrote that even though Kentucky had economic ties with the North, 
it was a southern state because of slavery. He claims that the state possessed an “unusual 
if not unique role” but most of the following essays failed to truly elaborate on the 
specific differences between Kentucky and the other southern states. This thesis states 
that Kentucky was different from other southern states during the secession crisis because 
they took economic advantage of both the Union and Confederacy. From the same 
collection of essays, historian Charles P. Roland notes that Kentucky’s attempt at 
remaining neutral was futile. Roland strongly emphasizes the secessionist elements in 
Kentucky and the attempt to create a Confederate government.
5
   
In another collection of essays, Sister States, Enemy States:  The Civil War in 
Kentucky and Tennessee, Gary R. Matthews argues that “In the end, a pragmatic respect 
for Northern economic dominance and a love for the historic national identity bolstered 
by a trust in the democratic process inspired a majority of Kentuckians to seek 
preservation of property and self by resisting the temptations of secession.” Matthews 
argues that Kentucky’s economic interests were rooted in the North, and so they adhered 
to northern nationalism. Recent scholarship continues to present conflicting views on the 
nature of Kentucky’s loyalty.6  
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Thomas C. Mackey has an article in the same collection as Matthews, Sister 
States, Enemy States. Mackey specifically disagrees with Coulter’s belief that Kentucky 
was a pariah; his central argument is that Kentucky was a major keystone during the 
secession crisis and Civil War. One of the key points of his argument is the importance to 
assess from which states Kentuckians originated. He specifically mentions the states of 
Virginia and North Carolina to explain Kentucky’s affinity for slavery. Mackey states the 
importance of examining the “ties of blood and livelihood”. He also believes that 
Kentuckians followed Virginian political leadership.   
Mackey explains the political importance of Henry Clay’s policies on slavery and 
economics even after his death. The author believes that Kentuckians were “Unionist in 
their wallets and Southern in their sentiments.”  Mackey believes that Clay’s view of 
slaveholding and his nationalism continued to guide Kentucky politics, opposing slavery 
because of the economic threat slavery posed to free white labor. They were also opposed 
to abolitionism. However, after making these important points Mackey fails to 
specifically explain the type of relationship Kentucky built with slavery.
7
  
Mackey seems to think that Kentucky was Unionist and would have sided with 
the Union at any cost. This paper disagrees; Kentucky would have remained neutral given 
the opportunity because of the prospering economics during the secession crisis. They 
preferred moderate politics according to the 1860’s election. Kentucky felt loyalty to the 
Union because of Clay’s politics but not nationalism.  
Many historians assume Kentucky was a southern state. However, as historian 
Anne Marshall points out in Creating a Confederate Kentucky, the Bluegrass State 
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became culturally Confederate after the war. To consider Kentucky a Confederate state 
during the war is misguided. Yes, Kentucky shared in the institution of slavery like others 
who sided with the Confederacy; this gave them a southern nature, but that affiliation was 
not strong enough to convince Kentucky to side with the Confederacy. Therefore, it was 
not a typical southern state. Kentucky did not have the strong nationalism for the Union 
or the Confederacy that some historians argue.  Marshall disagrees with Coulter in this 
aspect stating that his beliefs were too simplistic and that Kentucky did not have the 
collective consciousness that older historians suggested because they were only 
considering the white perspective. The desire for preservation of the Union could be 
considered nationalistic, but the determining factors for Kentucky were economics and 
the protection of property. In Kentucky, property meant, among other things, slaves. But 
Kentucky being a slave state does not necessarily categorize it as a Confederate state 
because of the distinct differences between slavery in Kentucky and the Deep South.
8
 
Many questions remain about Kentucky. To what extent did both northern and 
southern nationalism exist in Kentucky and to what extent did they affect Kentucky’s 
loyalty?   How can a state comprised of migrants from slave states such as Virginia, 
North Carolina, and Tennessee be primarily Unionist? How did the long term cause and 
their relationship with slavery affect Kentucky’s decision and economic interests? What 
was it about Kentucky that contributed to its remaining in the Union?  
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This paper will argue that Kentucky was not guided by nationalism but by 
economic self-interest, its use of slavery, and moderate “Clayite” politics. Kentucky 
Unionists viewed the Union as the appropriate choice for protecting their property, 
including their slaves. Slavery in Kentucky revolved around small farms with few slaves 
rather than the predominant plantation culture of the cotton South. Kentucky had a large 
population consisting of small farmers, specifically in the East, who had no economic 
interest in slavery.  Despite an affinity for slavery, Kentucky politics typically followed 
the ideals of Henry Clay concerning compromise and neutrality. This meant Kentucky 
did not adhere to southern nationalism and the call to protect slavery, nor did Kentucky 
favor the industrial North. Kentucky held greater concern for its regional interests than 
national ones. Louisville, which next to Cincinnati was the greatest commercial city on 
the Ohio River, prospered on trade more with the North than with the South. That section 
was extremely hostile to the idea of secession. To fully understand Kentucky’s reasoning 
for remaining neutral, one must understand first the history of the state’s economy, 
including the role of slavery, and the legacy of Henry Clay in the state’s politics.  
The second chapter will focus on Kentucky’s background and the development of 
its economics prior to the secession crisis. The settlement of Kentucky needs to be 
highlighted in order to understand the factors behind Kentucky’s arduous decisions. 
Many Kentuckians emigrated from Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee, all ardent 
slave states. These states, as well as slave trade, influenced Kentucky’s economy, trade, 
and its general social structure. Many settlers were from southern slave states, which 
meant they brought with them the particular institution that became a significant part of 
their lives, allowing Kentucky to transition from a frontier state to an economic 
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crossroads between the North and South. Kentucky also maintained northern connections 
with the states Ohio, Indiana, and Pennsylvania both through the migration of people and 
through the waterways, railroads, and goods that tied them to Kentucky industry.  
Chapter three highlights how Henry Clay exhibited moderate Kentucky politics. It 
is important to note the influence of Henry Clay’s political philosophy on later leaders in 
Kentucky.  Clay’s American System allowed Kentucky to transport goods, such as mules, 
horses, and tobacco, more efficiently, creating prosperity and expanding the state’s role 
in the slave trade. Clay’s role in the Missouri Compromise and the Compromise of 1850 
evidenced the moderating view shared by Kentuckians. Rather than ignite animosities on 
either side of the slavery issue, Clay and his fellow Kentuckians relied on compromise 
and neutrality to ensure continued economic growth. Political moderation set the 
groundwork for Kentucky politics during the secession crisis.  
The forth chapter discusses how the secession of the South presented Kentucky’s 
government with a dilemma. Many Kentuckians were extremely protective of slavery and 
their fear of slave emancipation fueled social racism. The election of 1860 divided 
Kentucky politics between native John C. Breckinridge and John Bell of Tennessee. 
Breckinridge surprisingly lost in his home state to Bell who ran on the Unionist ticket and 
promoted both the preservation of slavery and the Union. When it became clear that the 
Union would split, Kentucky’s leaders debated their state’s future.  A group of 
Conditional Unionists attempted to persuade the people to remain loyal to the Union on 
the condition of respected neutrality. Unionists and secessionists bombarded Kentucky 
with propaganda enticing them to join their cause.  Other southern states, especially 
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South Carolina, were particularly active. Both sides considered Kentucky a valuable asset 
because of its location and resources.   
Chapter five describes how the secession crisis ended with the invasion of 
Kentucky in September 1861. Confederate General Leonidas Polk shattered Kentucky’s 
neutrality and invaded Columbus.  This prompted Kentucky’s decision to officially align 
itself with the North. Unionists in Kentucky’s state government invited the Union to drive 
out the invading Confederates. Although Kentuckians began providing the North with 
troops and supplies, few ultimately served in the war, emphasizing their traditional 
neutrality towards national issues. Despite Kentucky’s loyalty to the Union by late 1861, 
it continued to be a relatively neutral player in the war. 
Kentucky’s role during the secession crisis was complicated. Its people came 
from many southern states, which influenced the development of institutions such as 
slavery and agriculture. But Kentucky was not exclusively a northern or southern state. 
Kentucky’s economic interests aligned with both the North and South. These interests 
encouraged powerful political leaders to guide the politics and people on the path of 
neutrality long promoted by their political icon, Henry Clay. Kentucky politicians sought 
to preserve their state and way of life, but the battle over their loyalty became literal. 
With the Confederacy invading from Tennessee, Kentucky joined the Union cause not 
out of nationalism, but out of economic preservation. 
10 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 
KENTUKCY’S POPULATION AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
 
The unique heritage of Kentucky is critical when considering Kentucky’s arduous 
decision of whether or not to join other slave states in seceding in 1861. Kentucky 
residents emigrated from both ardent slave states such as Virginia, North Carolina, and 
Tennessee as well as northern free states like Ohio, Indiana, and Pennsylvania.
9
 The 
majority of people residing in Kentucky during 1860 were from the slaveholding states of 
Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee. Migrants from the northern states of Ohio, 
Indiana, and Pennsylvania comprised twenty percent of Kentucky’s population. These 
migrants influenced Kentucky’s economy, trade, and general social structure. Southern 
migrants brought with them the particular institution that became a significant part of 
their lives, but in a different way than the Deep South. Kentucky was a crossroads 
between the North and South settled by small slave holders more concerned with 
domestic trade and manufacturing development than with the expansion of plantation 
agriculture. Kentucky quickly transitioned from a frontier state to an economic hub 
between the North and South.  
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10
 
Land ownership motivated the movement west into the Kentucky country. 
Farmers from Virginia, primarily English, Irish, Scottish, French, and German origin, 
ignored the Proclamation Line of 1763 prohibiting settlement of the frontier. Settlers in 
Kentucky struggled with setting up land plots and frequently had conflicting claims that 
overlapped because of inadequate surveys. Virginia established a land court in 1779 to 
help alleviate this issue. The court, comprised of Stephen Trigg, William Fleming, James 
Barbour, and Edmund Lynne, issued land warrants and approved claims. However, they 
failed to prevent survey duplications and a registry of warrants. The court’s lack of 
efficiency led to significant legal problems, which in turn allowed for young lawyers like 
John Cabell Breckinridge and Henry Clay to gain valuable notoriety.
11
 
Kentucky, like many frontier territories, underwent change in intervals. The first 
adventurers were trappers and hunters, like Daniel Boone, followed by the Indian fighters 
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 U.S. Bureau of the Census.  Eighth Census of the United States, 1860. Washington, D.C., 1860, 
176- 187. 
11
 Thomas D. Clark, A History of Kentucky (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1937), 85-90. 
# State Population %
1 Virginia 45,310                30%
2 Tennesse 34,127                23%
3 Ohio 14,419                10%
4 North Carolina 13,609                9%
5 Indiana 7,883                 5%
6 Pennsylvania 7,841                 5%
7 Maryland 4,412                 3%
8 New York 4,170                 3%
9 Illinois 2,617                 2%
10 Missouri 2,585                 2%
136,973              92%
11,859                8%
148,832              100%
Sum of top 10
Remaining 27
Total
1860 US Census Data
12 
 
and surveyors. They were followed by the land squatters as well as planters who bought 
large tracts of land and expanded their plantations. Overseers and slaves arrived ahead of 
the plantation families, mainly in the Bluegrass area to prepare the land for settlement 
and agriculture. Through this process Kentucky became a place for the gentry’s younger 
sons in Virginia to make their start because Virginia’s land laws gave precedence to the 
older sons of planters allowing them to inherit their father’s estates thereby forcing the 
younger sons to make their fortunes elsewhere.
12
  
The early settlers in Kentucky found Indians already inhabiting the area. 
Kentuckians faced problems with local and northern Indian tribes specifically the 
Cherokee and Shawnee. The Indians wanted to drive the settlers out because they were 
encroaching on tribal land and hunting territory. This made it difficult for settlers to raise 
crops and livestock as well as bring in supplies. A few men through Kentucky’s early 
history successfully battled the Indians to protect their people and establishments. 
Between 1783 and 1790 problems with Indians flared up again specifically with the 
Wabash River tribes and the Miami tribe. It was estimated that about fifteen hundred 
people were captured or killed along with around twenty thousand horses stolen.
13
 Men 
enlisted to fight the Indians, but they did not care for fighting under commissioned 
officers because they did not believe that the new commissioned officers were familiar 
with methods used in frontier warfare. After several defeats and the failure of the federal 
government to protect Kentucky from Indian raids, President George Washington 
appointed General “Mad” Anthony Wayne as commander of the western branch of the 
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 Lowell H. Harrison and James C. Koltter, New History of Kentucky (Lexington: University of 
Kentucky, 1997), 6-7; 33-35; 70-71. 
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army. On July 26
th
, 1794, American forces regrouped and, on August 30
th
, they 
challenged the Indians at the Battle of Fallen Timbers. Wayne’s strategy was successful 
as the Americans suffered only thirty-three dead and one hundred wounded. This battle 
freed Kentuckians from the Indian raids of the North.
14
  
One of the last major battles Kentuckians had with Indians concerned Tecumseh 
and The Prophet. They clashed with William Henry Harrison because he attempted to 
persuade the Indians to cede their land with the promise of protecting them from the 
white settlers. Some Indians ceded the land along the Wabash River accounting for 2.5 
million acres. This angered Tecumseh which caused him to rally his confederation to 
attack Harrison on November 6, 1811, an offensive known as the Battle of Tippecanoe. 
Convinced that Americans were not trustworthy, Tecumseh sought an alliance with the 
British.
15
  
Kentucky's road to statehood was extremely difficult as evidenced by the ten 
conventions it took to ratify a constitution.  Issues ranged from debates over the 
legitimacy of Virginia’s requirement of equal county representation, abandoning religious 
and property qualifications during the fifth convention to allow free white males of age to 
vote, to even having to conclude the fourth convention early due to too many delegates 
fighting Indians.  At one time delegates even debated a complete separation not only 
from Virginia but from the United States as a whole to seek an alliance with Spain.  After 
                                                          
14
 Clark, A History of Kentucky, 90-95; 138-144. 
15
 Harrison and Koltter, New History of Kentucky, 88. 
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nearly ten years of conventions, Kentucky finally gained statehood on June 1, 1792, 
becoming the fourteenth state to enter the Union.
16
 
In 1798, Kentucky adopted resolutions that reflected Jeffersonian ideals. At 
Cheapside in Lexington George Nicholas, a law professor at Transylvania University, 
denounced Federalist laws, the Alien and Sedition Acts, claiming that they attacked 
American freedom. At that same meeting, Henry Clay gained notoriety for his republican 
views. Kentucky’s press worked hard against these laws and encouraged Thomas 
Jefferson to use Kentucky in his fight against them. Jefferson authored the Kentucky 
Resolution which argued that the Alien and Sedition Acts were unconstitutional, and he 
created the idea of nullification. The Kentucky Resolution proclaimed “that the several 
states who formed that instrument (the Constitution) being sovereign and independent, 
have the unquestionable right to judge of its infractions; and that a nullification, by those 
sovereignties, of all unauthorized acts done under colour of that instrument is the rightful 
remedy.” 17 Kentucky, like Virginia, was more adamant about states’ rights during 
Adams’ administration than other southern states, a drastically different stance than 
during the secession crisis.  
This was one of the first acts of promoting states’ rights over federal authority. On 
November 10, 1798, the Kentucky Resolution passed, leaving Democratic-Republicans in 
control. Now in a position of power, the Democratic-Republicans took the opportunity to 
reevaluate Kentucky’s first constitution; believing it to be a failure. Preparations were 
made to hold another constitutional convention. After much debate and voting, the 
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 Harrison and Koltter, New History of Kentucky, 58-64. 
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 J. Winston Coleman, Jr., Slavery Times in Kentucky (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 
1940), 4-20. 
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second constitution passed on June 1
st
, 1800. The second constitution was fairly 
conservative and reorganized the state government and established laws guarding against 
any attempt to emancipate slaves.  Under the new constitution, slavery could not be 
eliminated without the consent of slaveholders. From the beginning, Kentucky cultivated 
a unique form of slavery due to its government and economics.
18
   
The institution of slavery, and what it meant for Kentucky, was different from the 
other southern states. Since many Kentuckians emigrated from slave states, they brought 
with them the peculiar institution. It became the foundation of their economy, but for 
Kentucky slavery existed on a much smaller scale. In Kentucky slaves functioned as 
small farm laborers unlike their plantation counterparts in the Cotton South, thus 
establishing Kentucky’s unique use of slavery.  
Strong ties with slave states such as Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee 
allowed Kentucky to develop a prosperous economy. Slaves comprised about twenty-four 
percent of Kentucky’s population in 1830. Many of the slaves resided in the region 
between Louisville and Lexington, controlled primarily by small planters. Slave labor 
drove Kentucky’s growing hemp economy aiding in the growth of the Bluegrass Region, 
the lands around Louisville and Lexington where large slaveholders resided. The 
Bluegrass Region held over 124,000 slaves, fifty-five percent of Kentucky’s total in 
1860. By 1840 Kentucky was the leading hemp producer in the nation and its economy 
expanded to manufacturing ropes and bags. Southern states purchased these bags for 
packaging cotton and, with a booming cotton economy; Kentucky’s hemp remained in 
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Caste (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University, 1996), 34-47. 
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high demand. Tobacco, Kentucky’s other primary staple crop, had a short growing season 
and required less slave labor than cotton, which contributed to Kentucky’s propensity to 
support small slaveholders over large plantation owners. To many Kentuckians, the 
words “planter” and “farmer” became interchangeable by 1835 because of the relative 
absence of a typical southern plantation. According to the 1860 census only seven 
Kentucky men listed themselves as planters.
19
 To qualify as a planter a person must have 
owned twenty or more slaves. 
 The North and the industries it represented proved to be of great import to 
Kentucky. Kentuckians both imported from and exported to the North through the 
multiple railroads that tied them with those states.
20
 The majority of Kentucky’s exports 
consisted of agricultural produce and livestock. Products such as ginseng and whiskey 
could turn a profit when sent to Philadelphia. Several goods were exported downstream 
where they were loaded on ships and sent to East Coast ports or to European markets. 
The establishment of railroads allowed a trading surplus of products like horses, meat, 
and corn with the large cities and manufacturing towns of the North.
21
 
The dominance of small slaveholders created a type of relationship between 
master and slave in Kentucky different from any other state with slaves. In 1860 there 
were 110,937 men registered as farmers.
22
 Since Kentucky’s early settlement, slaves and 
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masters worked together. Whether it was working in the fields or warding off Indian 
raids, this relationship had a different meaning. One of the reasons for the unique 
relationship between master and slave was that there were no other sources of cheap labor 
especially during Kentucky’s early settlement. Many of the immigrants moving to 
Kentucky were of German descent and, since slavery did not exist in their country, they 
did not have much inclination towards it. Many Germans settled along the Ohio River 
and in Jefferson County which had minimal slavery. Kentucky had a dramatic increase in 
its population between 1790 and 1800, which led to the division of the land into small 
farms. This caused a change evolving Kentucky’s use of slavery to a smaller scale unique 
form unlike those in the deep southern states.
23
   
In lieu of large-scale, plantation-based slavery, Kentucky slaveholding evolved 
differently. By 1850 about twenty-eight percent of white families owned slaves with the 
average slaveholder owning around five slaves. According to the 1860 census 
Kentuckians had more slaveholders than any other state except Virginia and Georgia, but 
they had far fewer slaves. Compared to other border states, Kentucky had fewer slaves 
per capita.  For instance, in 1860, Kentucky had a larger population than Tennessee while 
maintaining eighteen percent fewer slaves overall.  Virginia, however, exceeded 
Kentucky's population by only sixteen percent and maintained a slave population nearly 
twice that of Kentucky's. No Kentucky family owned over three hundred slaves and in 
many instances owned as few as one. These are much smaller numbers than the average 
for a plantation society as well as other border states. Owners who possessed one to five 
slaves constituted the greatest number of Kentucky slaveholders, around thirteen 
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thousand in all. Kentucky was an economically prosperous state that utilized a smaller, 
less rigid form of slavery to support, rather than expand, the growing cotton industry of 
the South.
24
  
25
 
Beyond hemp and tobacco, the Bluegrass state also provided meat, grain, 
livestock, and slaves. Many slaves who labored in the Deep South harvesting cotton were 
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from Kentucky. The climate and soil in Kentucky were not suited for a plantation system. 
Tobacco crops exhausted the soil, but it was the main form of agricultural labor for which 
slavery would be an advantage. Kentuckians felt slaves required too much supervision for 
simple tasks during the planting, cultivation, and cutting of tobacco. Kentucky also did 
not have one staple crop but five, thus allowing for a diverse agricultural system. 
Kentucky’s staple crops of wheat, corn, rye, tobacco, and hemp rendered slavery less 
useful because they required careful supervision, more than Kentuckians wanted to 
provide. It was difficult to keep slavery profitable during both of the growing seasons.
26
 
Kentucky’s good farming soil allowed for lush grasslands and grain production 
which supported raising livestock and proved to be more profitable because it, unlike 
tobacco and hemp, was easily transported to eastern markets. For many farmers the mule 
was as important as a slave. Livestock passing over the Cumberland Ford in 1828 was 
estimated to be worth $1,100,000. This included 3,412 horses, 3,228 mules, 97,455 hogs, 
2,141 sheep, and 1,525 stall-fed cattle. Within ten years, the value of livestock increased 
to $1,750,000. The growth of other industries caused Kentucky slavery to become less 
important and gave way to another profitable venture, the domestic slave trade.
27
 
The domestic slave trading profits surged in Kentucky from 1820-1830. 
Afterward Kentucky transitioned towards an expansive domestic slave trade market for 
the next thirty years. The value of slaves increased in the states of Louisiana, Alabama, 
Mississippi, and Texas in 1845 because of rapid expansion of cotton plantations. As a 
result Kentuckians sold their slaves for great profit. Slaves were commonly shipped down 
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the Mississippi River where they were groomed and sold to planters in places like 
Rodney and Natchez, Mississippi, or New Orleans. As new territory opened in the South 
for cotton production, some Kentuckians took the opportunity to move south to expand 
their own landholdings where they found more slaves were needed helping to increase 
the demand for slaves from their home state. While the state benefited from slavery, 
thereby separating it from northern ideals, Kentucky's economy was definitively shaped 
by the trading of slaves instead of traditional plantation agriculture and thus distinguished 
from the rest of the South.
28
  
For many Kentuckians the domestic slave trade grew into a profitable business. 
According to J. Winston Coleman, Jr., the trading of slaves began with a somewhat 
innocent practice of purchasing and swapping of slaves between individual owners to 
satisfy their own needs. However, a moral line was clearly defined and to be known as a 
“nigger trader” was degradation to any man. Many Kentuckians viewed the buying and 
selling of slaves for profit as detestable. Men who stooped to become traders performed 
the practice of splitting up families and covering up the physical defects of slaves for a 
larger profit. It is not clear when the slave trade in Kentucky began, but one account from 
1818 noted a scene of fourteen slaves traveling on flatboats heading down the 
Mississippi. J. Winston Coleman, Jr., wrote that the slave trade became a lucrative 
business for Kentuckians, and “in the 1850s alone, traders sold approximately 15 percent 
of the state’s slaves southward.” Slavery was losing its grip on its importance in 
Kentucky; the slave trade was growing because the usefulness of slavery within 
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Kentucky was diminishing.
29
  About seventy-seven thousand slaves were sold south over 
three decades. Annually the average of Kentucky slaves exported was approximately 
twenty-three thousand.
30
  
Kentucky slave traders preferred to take their slaves to the South in the autumn. It 
allowed for better travel conditions and encouraged planters to purchase more because it 
followed the harvest season for cotton and sugar cane. If traders waited until the fall 
slaves were usually sent by water primarily along the Ohio River to the Mississippi 
River. Some traders would send their slaves south in the summer months to help prepare 
them for their new lives in a much hotter climate. Traders stressed acclimation because 
around twenty-five percent of slaves would not survive in the Deep South when coming 
from Maryland, Virginia, or Kentucky. For traders, slaves who could not survive in the 
new climate could not yield a profit.
31
 
The belief remained that slave trading was evil despite the profitability. There was 
a significant amount of support for the passage of the Non-Importation Act of 1833. 
Nicknamed the Negro Law of 1833, it prohibited slaves to be brought into Kentucky for 
selling purposes. Slave traders were forced to rely on natural increases of slaves in 
Kentucky for their shipments to southern markets. Some border states, including 
Kentucky, understood that loophole and bred slaves to be sold to southern markets. Close 
attention was paid to the breeding and care of slaves much akin to that of horses and 
mules. Kentucky traders made such a large profit because they raised and shipped slaves 
downriver. This allowed companies, such as Hughes & Downing and Griffin & Pullum 
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from Lexington, that were established in 1843, to exist for the sole purpose of acquiring 
slaves in Kentucky and selling them to the South. Businesses like these were common 
and considered similar to livestock trading firms, particularly because auction sales for 
livestock were common. Slave trading and the businesses that specialized in this helped 
to define the economy of the Kentucky in the early 19th century.
32
  
Slave trading companies proved to be incredibly profitable in Kentucky. In 
October 1843, Hughes & Downing purchased thirteen slaves in Kentucky for $5,292.50. 
Companies were able to sell these slaves in 1844 for $8,695. It cost the company $257.72 
to transport the slaves from Lexington to Natchez, which netted them a profit of 
$3,144.76. In the Upper South, a Virginia railroad master machinist would make on 
average $84 a year in 1859. A skilled laborer would typically earn a yearly income of $50 
to $150 between 1855 and 1860. Compared to the typical income of the period, Hughes 
& Downing made a handsome profit.
33
  
Slave trading profitability was due in part to the rising prices of slaves during the 
cotton boom of the 1840s and 1850s. From 1846 to 1860, the price of a prime male field 
hand nearly doubled from $690 to $1,318. This price increase can be attributed to the 
southern economy recovering and prospering from the cotton depression of the late 
1830s. From 1840 to 1860, the slave population in Kentucky increased 6.87 percent. The 
slave trade was clearly significant to Kentucky’s economy.34  
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By 1859, the slave trade was a booming business. In Paris, Kentucky, for 
example, slaves who were eighteen years old sold for $1,135 to $1,220. Females who 
were sixteen and seventeen years old went for $435 to $695. Males about twenty-four 
years old sold for $1,200 cash. In Georgetown on January 1
st
, 1859, there were twenty-
five slaves sold for a total of $20,140. The prices of these purchases ranged from $1,500 
for a nineteen year old male, $1, 550 for a twenty year old male, and $1,190 for a thirty-
two year old man. Thirteen year old girls brought in $1,000 each and a sixteen year old 
girl sold for $1,441. Slaves were often sold at high prices, based on their value as workers 
in the cotton fields, their ability to work in the master’s home, or their reproductive 
value.
35
  
In 1849 Kentucky’s legislature repealed the Non-Importation Act, increasing the 
business for slave traders. It allowed slaves from other states to be brought into Kentucky 
and sold on Kentucky markets. The repeal turned Kentucky into a slave market for the 
Deep South. Repealing the act opened the market for more people to participate in slave 
trading and withdrew some of the social stigma associated with it. This took away the 
shame of the business and allowed for social acceptance among many Kentuckians. An 
ad taken out in the Lexington Observer and Reporter stated, “I WISH to purchase a large 
lot of merchantable Negroes, for whom I will pay the highest market cash price.” 
Without shame, the business of slave trading prospered because traders were now able to 
operate openly and they quickly turned to newspapers to advertise their business.
36
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The newly legitimized occupation of slave trading expanded its business practices 
drastically during the next decade. Slave “jails” became common during this period of 
expansion. Slaves could be jailed while waiting for a buyer. Several accounts of slave 
“jails” suggest they were rather comfortable being spacious and carpeted. Some works 
mention expensive beautiful mulatto women being choice stock for mistresses. Lexington 
and New Orleans were known to have a market for “fancy girls,” or slave women who 
were bought and sold as mistresses or concubines for the wealthy. Wealthy planters, 
horse breeders, and gamblers were among the best customers in these markets, and sexual 
abuse was not uncommon.
37
 
William Brown, a slave born in Lexington, described one such account of sexual 
abuse of slaves. Brown recalled one girl from his travels named Cynthia, describing her 
as “as one of the most beautiful women he ever saw.” Cynthia was purchased by a Mr. 
Walker to be sold in New Orleans. Brown was told to take Cynthia to her own room. “I 
had seen too much of the workings of slavery not to know what this meant. I accordingly 
watched him enter the state-room and listened to hear what passed between them. I heard 
him make his base offers and her reject them. He told her that if she would accept his vile 
proposals he would take her back with him to St. Louis, and establish her as his house 
keeper at his farm. But if she persisted in rejecting him, he would sell her as a field hand 
on the worst plantation on the river.” He went on to write that, “Neither threats nor bribes 
prevailed, however, and he retired, disappointed of his prey.” Brown goes on with his 
account of seeing Cynthia the next morning very upset. He explained that she went back 
to St. Louis with Mr. Walker to his farm where he placed her as his housekeeper and 
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mistress. By the time William Brown was finished working for Mr. Walker, Mr. Walker 
had two children with Cynthia. Later Brown learned that Walker had married another 
woman and sold Cynthia and their four children into “hopeless bondage.”38  
On several occasions, the slave traders were dishonest with their deals and sold 
sickly slaves to unsuspecting customers. Some passed off slaves to be younger by 
doctoring their appearance. In the case of Mr. Walker, Brown was in charge of grooming 
some of the slaves that his master wanted to sell. Mr. Walker hired, not bought, Brown 
from his master because of his ability to work on a boat. Mr. Walker was a slave trader, 
but known to slaves as a “soul driver”. In his account Brown wrote about a large room on 
the lower deck of the boat where the slaves were kept, both men and women. Slaves were 
under strict watch to ensure they did not escape. The slaves were fed well on the boat, 
most of them better than at home. Brown also recalled how he “had to prepare the old 
slaves for market” and “was ordered to have the old men’s whiskers shaved off, and the 
grey hairs on their heads plucked out, where they were not too numerous, in which case 
we had a preparation of blacking to color it, and with a blacking blush we would put it 
on.” He added that this “was new business to me, and [was] performed in a room where 
the passengers could not see us. These slaves were also taught how old they were, and 
after going through the blacking process they looked ten years younger.” He believed 
“some of the planters who purchased these slaves were dreadfully cheated, especially in 
the ages of the slaves they bought.”39  
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The journey South was difficult on many slaves coming from the Border States. 
In order to protect their investment, slave traders purchased insurance on the slaves. One 
trader noted, “They die daily . . . some has actually died in the cars going south 5 or 6 has 
died out at Lumpkins jail . . . But all the grown ones I had insured as soon as I bought 
them . . .” Many slave traders were willing to pay good money to protect their 
investments with insurance, thus ensuring a larger return. Death, though, was not the only 
fear for slaves being sold downriver.
40
  
The fate of slaves was always uncertain. News of traders gathering slaves created 
much excitement and fear for slaves as shown in Mattie Griffith’s slave narrative. She 
was owned by a Mr. Peterkin and lived on a farm in Nelson County, Kentucky. Mr. 
Peterkin purchased Mattie when she was a small child and she became handmaid to his 
daughter, Jane. One afternoon in 1854, a trader came to the Peterkin farm wanting slaves 
to buy to sell downriver. After greeting the trader, two slave girls ran inside squealing 
“Oh, we’s in danger; a nigger-trader is talkin’ wid master,” they cried. The thought of 
leaving the farm and being sold down river to an unknown fate was terrifying for slaves. 
Upon seeing the trader, Mattie described him as “more like a fiend than a man.” Mr. 
Perterkin had his female slaves line up in the kitchen to be surveyed by the trader and, 
after picking through what he wanted, he turned his eyes on Mattie. He asked Mr. 
Peterkin, “What will you take for this yallow gal?” The master replied, “I ain’t much 
anxious to sell her; she is my darter Jane’s waitin’ ‘ooman, and, you see, my darters are 
putty much stuck up. They thinks they must have a waitin’-maid; but, if you offer a far 
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price, maybe we will close in.”  The trader countered, “Wal, as she is a fancy article, I’ll 
jist say take twelve hundred dollars, and that’s more an’ she’s actilly worth; but I wants 
her fur my own use; a sorter private gal like, you knows,” Coming to an understanding 
Mr. Peterkin said, “I reckon the bargain is closed, then.”  
Mattie, knowing the disgrace that was to come at the hands of the trader, could 
not believe her master would sell her for such a purpose. Miss Jane reentered the kitchen 
asking her father who was sold. Upon finding out his intention to sell her maid she 
exclaimed, “She shan’t go for six thousand. I want an accomplished maid when I go up to 
the city, and she just suits me. Remember I have your deed of gift.” This was quite a 
relief to Mattie because she “felt assured that my honor would remain unstained.” Miss 
Jane saved Mattie from the fate of being taken by the trader, though her case was clearly 
an exception. Her fate would have been like the girls in the houses in Lexington and New 
Orleans. Despite being profitable for the state, traders were both feared by slaves and 
considered pariahs to decent Kentuckians who viewed their practices as amoral.
41
  
Not all Kentuckians agreed with slave trading. William M. Pratt was a Baptist 
minister in Lexington, Kentucky, who felt pity for slaves being shipped downriver in the 
slave trade. In 1860, he encountered a slave named Nancy Lee. She approached Reverend 
Pratt extremely upset because her two daughters were intended for sale to the South. The 
father of the girls, Tony Lee, was successful in buying their freedom and gave them their 
papers just before he died. But slave traders visited Nancy and scammed her in order to 
obtain and destroy the girls’ papers. Afterward the girls were offered for sale at an 
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auction on February 13, 1860. Reverend Pratt bid for the first girl in an attempt to save 
her, but the price reached $1,000. Pratt stood on the auction block and pleaded for bidders 
to withdraw out of compassion and human decency. He was unsuccessful and the bidding 
resumed, raising the price to $1,700. The girl sold to the slave firm of Northcutt and 
Marshall and the second sister sold for $1,600 to a slave trader from Covington. These 
events upset and made an impression on Pratt, who wrote in his diary that “such scenes 
are shocking to our moral natures. If God’s curse does not rest on that concern (of Negro 
traders) then I am no prophet. Negro traders are the greatest curse to our land, and I do 
wish the city council would impose such a tax as to drive them from our midst.” These 
words convey an intense dislike and concern for the moral wellbeing of society. Although 
it was morally questionable, slave trading was legal and set Kentucky’s use of slavery 
apart from the Cotton South.
42
 
On October 15, 1854 Abraham Lincoln expressed similar sentiments when he 
gave a moving speech in Peoria, Illinois concerning his opinion of slave merchants. “You 
have among you a sneaking individual of the class of native tyrants, known as the ‘slave 
dealer.’ He watches your necessities and crawls up to buy your slave at a speculative 
price. If you cannot help it, you sell to him; but if you can help it, you drive him from 
your door.” He added with disdain, “You utterly despise him. You do not recognize him 
as your friend or even as an honest man. Your children must not play with his; they may 
rollick freely with the little negroes, but not with the slave dealer’s children.” Lincoln 
believed that the slave traders were one of the lowest forms of people in society. Slave 
traders needed to be ostracized and banished from decent society. Lincoln had firsthand 
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knowledge of the slave traders and their ways while growing up in Kentucky. It was also 
visible when he went with his wife home to visit her family. An ad placed in the 
newspaper by the new tenants of the Pullum House near Lincoln’s in-laws in Lexington 
read, “NEGROES WANTED! WE have purchased the trading house of W. A. Pullum in 
the city of Lexington.” They wanted to purchase African Americans to sell down the 
river. It was astonishing how much profit was made from these businesses in Kentucky 
even with the moral dilemma it caused many citizens.
43
  
There were some individuals who had issues with the morality of trafficking 
slaves and some of these men attempted to do something about the problem. One 
outspoken slaveholder against the evils of slave trading was Robert Wickliffe. 
Nicknamed the Old Duke, Wickliffe was the largest slaveholder in the Bluegrass Region. 
He appeared before the legislature in 1840 condemning the growing slave trade in 
Kentucky and blaming the Cotton Kingdom for this evil. Wickliffe stated “that for the 
honor, as well as the security of our state, our next Legislature will put a stop to the 
abominable traffic.” He continued, “We believe that, generally speaking, slaves are 
treated with more humanity in Kentucky than any other state in the Union, and could the 
horrid practice of driving them like cattle to the market be broken up, a great blot would 
certainly be wiped off our moral character.” Being a large slaveholder, Wickliffe was not 
against owning slaves but against unjust treatment and herding them like cattle. He 
proudly believed that most slaves should be treated with decency and humanity in 
Kentucky. Trafficking slaves was disgraceful not only to the people performing the act 
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but to Kentucky as a state. His appeal was received with little enthusiasm from the 
General Assembly and had little success because of the profit to be gained. Unfortunately 
for the Old Duke, slave traders were often secretly bankrolled by the prominent men of 
the era behind closed doors.
44
  
Many people all over the South considered interstate slave trading an unbecoming 
element of society. Interstate slave trading was forbidden in nine different states at 
various times during the nineteenth century. In 1778, Virginia was the first to pass a law 
against the introduction of slaves prohibiting importation by land or sea. Almost every 
state and territory by 1803 passed laws to temporarily restrict importation of slaves from 
abroad. South Carolina was an important exception to other states. On December 17
th
, 
1803, South Carolina had repealed her law and once again allowed the importation of 
slaves from Africa. The opening of this trade allowed 39,075 slaves to be imported 
through Charleston. Congress became involved in 1807, passing a bill against slave 
importation into the country after January 1
st
, 1808. Although it imposed a penalty of jail 
time and a steep fine attached to any violation, it was not always effective. While many 
states prohibited interstate slave trading, most repealed laws against importation. North 
Carolina repealed its law in 1818, followed by Virginia in 1819, Alabama in 1832, 
Louisiana in 1834, Mississippi in 1846, South Carolina in 1848, Maryland in 1850, 
Georgia in 1855-56, and Tennessee in 1855. Arkansas and Missouri were in need of 
slaves, so importation laws were never passed with the exception of criminals. Florida 
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and Texas were the same in only barring criminals, but Kentucky was the only 
exception.
45
 
The Non-Importation Act of 1833 prohibited residents from buying and importing 
slaves even for personal use. Residents of Kentucky could bring slaves whose title was 
obtained “by will, descent, distribution, or marriage, or gift in consideration of marriage.” 
Kentucky allowed migrants to bring slaves to the state. Citizens largely disregarded the 
law prohibiting residents from buying and importing slaves for their personal use. This is 
evident by the repeal of the law in 1849. The laws for the other states, like Kentucky, 
were a type of police regulation; they were used “mainly to ward off evils attributed to 
interstate slave-traders.” These laws only temporarily affected the methods and ways of 
the interstate slave trade. These led to a greater political discussion over slavery in the 
1850s.
46
 
Kentucky’s unique agriculture required less slave labor than other states. Instead 
of benefiting through traditional slavery, Kentucky’s practice of slave trading defined the 
economy of the state while distinguishing its economic interests from the North and 
ideals from the South.  Kentucky remained a significant contributor to both economies 
until neutrality was violated during the secession crisis. Up and coming politician Henry 
Clay realized the importance of national compromise early. Through temperate politics 
he managed to increase Kentucky’s economic opportunities with the creation of the 
American System.  Kentucky would quickly subscribe to Clay’s moderate politics which 
became his legacy staying with Kentucky long after his death. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF KENTUCKY’S POLITICS: HENRY CLAY’S INFLEUENCE 
 
In 1850, Henry Clay ardently pleaded with Congress to put aside sectional 
differences and compromise for the love of the Union. Begging both northern and 
southern politicians, Clay simply stated that “before the fearful and disastrous leap is 
taken in the yawning abyss below…I implore, as the best blessing which Heaven can 
bestow upon me upon earth, that if the direful and sad event of the dissolution of the 
Union shall happen, I may not survive to behold the sad and heart-rendering spectacle.” 
Clay wanted Congress to concede a little for the good of all. Despite the strong political 
opposition Clay dedicated his life to keeping the Union intact.
47
 
 Henry Clay molded Kentucky politics through his support of the American 
System, his views on slavery, and his emphasis on finding compromise, as seen in the 
Missouri Crisis of 1820-21 and the Crisis of 1850. Clay fought continually for Kentucky-
oriented industries with his American system, helping the state prosper because of its 
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natural resources and geographic position. Kentuckians looked for a political hero as a 
replacement for Clay after his death but could not find one as influential. He held 
different beliefs than other politicians such as John C. Calhoun and Andrew Jackson. 
Clay’s dominance in Kentucky and national politics shaped the future of both realms and 
created a path for his Clayite followers in the crisis of secession. 
Most historians believe that Henry Clay, through his actions and beliefs, affected 
Kentucky’s political opinions and policies during the 1850s. He had a compromising 
nature politically that lingered throughout the secession crisis. Historians acknowledge 
his devotion to Kentucky and the Union as well as his belief in states’ rights. Because of 
Clay’s broad influence, Thomas C. Mackey describes Kentucky as “Unionist in their 
wallets and Southern in their sentiments.”48  
Born April 12
th
, 1777, Henry Clay grew up in Hanover County, Virginia. His 
father died while he was still young, leaving his mother to care for him and his siblings. 
Clay’s only formal schooling was spending three years at Peter Deacon’s one-room log 
cabin school near where they lived. Clay spent a considerable amount of time learning 
the ways of the planter class, particularly recreational activities such as drinking and 
horse racing. Despite Clay’s affinity for recreation, Judge George Wythe soon noticed 
Clay for his impressive handwriting and offered him a job.  Wythe became Clay’s mentor 
and friend, allowing him to borrow books from his personal library and engaging in 
discussions with Clay over numerous topics ranging from politics to religion. Clay 
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learned how to carry on intellectual conversations and behave in the elite circles of 
society.
49
 
Wythe also shaped Clay’s future in politics. It was Wythe who convinced Clay to 
become a lawyer. Wythe had too many burdens as chancellor to take on a student, but he 
asked Robert Brooke to instruct Clay in late 1796. With only a year of instruction, Clay 
was ready for his bar examination and on November 6
th
, 1797, began practicing law in 
Virginia.
50
  
Blonde-haired, well-dressed, and with an easy smile, Clay grew into a well 
groomed young man ready for the task at hand; however, remaining in Virginia was not 
an appealing option. There were numerous lawyers in Richmond already, leaving him 
with little room to advance his career. He knew that to make himself into a prominent 
man he needed to go somewhere else. His family in Kentucky prospered during his 
absence with his brother becoming a merchant in Lexington and his mother and 
stepfather owning a hostelry. In 1797, Clay set out for Kentucky to make a name for 
himself using the lessons from his mentors.
51
 
By 1803, Clay had won his first seat in the state House of Representatives. The 
following year the Kentucky Insurance Company became the target of Representative 
Felix Grundy. Grundy did not want the Bluegrass Region, comprised of planters, in 
control of the House so he took on an organization that was financially significant to 
them. Grundy went head-to-head with Clay in debates, but after a few days Grundy had 
enough votes to pass his bill and take away the banking function from the Kentucky 
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Insurance Company. Kentucky governor Christopher Greenup vetoed Grundy’s bill citing 
Clay’s argument. An upset Grundy managed to have the House override the veto, but this 
provided Clay with one more chance. Acting quickly, Henry Clay had the House demand 
immediate payment for an old debt from speculators who purchased state lands along 
Green River on credit. The spectators had gotten away with not paying for so long 
because of bargains made with the legislature, but this action prompted them to put 
pressure on the Senate which worked. The Senate did not pass Grundy’s bill because of 
Clay’s quick thinking and the Kentucky Insurance Company was able to keep its banking 
function. After proving himself and spending several years in the House, he was elected 
as speaker. Clay quickly became an important political figure for Kentucky.
52
 
His success as a politician boosted him from the state to federal level. Clay’s 
affinity for politics and public speaking earned him a great respect among his 
constituents. He was elected as a Democratic-Republican to the United States Senate to 
fill the vacancy left by Buckner Thruston’s resignation in 1810. He performed well and 
earned a seat as a Democratic-Republican in the House of Representatives. After 1811 
Clay was re-elected five times to Congress. He held the title Speaker of the House of 
Representatives for the last three sessions.
53
 
When Clay arrived in Congress in 1810, he became interested in the economic 
development of the United States. He witnessed a debate about the military 
appropriations bill and found himself an avid supporter of an amendment that made the 
Secretary of the Navy give priority to domestic markets and suppliers over foreign 
sources for hemp products, specifically rope and sailcloth. Clay’s home state of Kentucky 
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was a major producer of those products including his own hemp crops at his plantation, 
Ashland.
54
 
Clay favored improving the American economy regardless of the controversy 
over the National Bank. In the legislative session of 1816, Henry Clay supported a bill 
that would increase the profits of textile companies in Kentucky. He wanted to protect 
American goods from British competition at the end of the War of 1812. He felt that the 
British were dumping excess goods on the United States at cheaper prices to destroy the 
American market. It was Clay’s belief that a self-sustaining nation not be subject to 
foreign economic domination. A tariff Clay supported in April 1816 was only moderately 
protective. The rates on several imports were lower than the rates during the war. Clay 
did not get the protection for textile market that he wanted. His support was an attempt to 
protect his home state’s interests.55  
Promoting a program of protective tariffs and extensive expenditures for national 
improvement, Clay made his first attempt in 1824 for the presidency. His first bid ended 
with disappointment but allowed him the appointment of Secretary of State. Clay, siding 
with Adams, made Jackson and his followers enemies because of their belief that he sold 
his influence in the corrupt bargain for the new position.
56
  
In his second attempt, Clay entered the 1832 presidential election as a National 
Republican candidate.  He received heavy criticism for his American System and lost to 
Jackson’s reelection.  In 1836, Clay rebranded himself as a Whig and served in Congress 
until March 31
st
, 1842, when he resigned. Clay ran for president on the Whig ticket in 
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1844 and was defeated by James K. Polk. His last political contribution was his efforts in 
the Compromise of 1850. As a senator, Clay dedicated his life towards the progress of the 
Union while contending with a nation torn by strong opposition from other political 
rivals.
57
 
 
On May 10
th, 1820, Clay introduced his famous “American System” to illustrate 
not only his plan for national economic sovereignty but also a commitment to republican 
liberty without the corruption of old European ways. The passing of the Tariff of 1824 
established the American System. There were some who fought Clay because of the 1824 
tariff. Members of Congress from South Carolina exclaimed that Clay was pushing for an 
unfair sectional advantage for Kentucky and her hemp industry. In part, their complaint 
was based on an extra tax added to the shipping of southern cotton. Although the House 
of Representatives debated this issue for two weeks, Clay and his supporters won by a 
thin margin. By the end of the debate, Clay established his economic protective principles 
known as the American System.
58
  
The basis for Clay’s American System was free enterprise among Americans 
only. The plan would work by placing a higher tariff on foreign imports. He wanted 
America to be self-reliant by increasing American manufacturing and reducing foreign 
trade. The US economic activity would be undertaken by American individuals.
59
 
As long as the war in Europe continued, the domestic market was profitable. 
When the war was over, American manufacturers would need to improve their 
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production methods to remain competitive. Clay believed that America needed to 
industrialize, but America could have a different fate than the British manufacturing 
centers. He wanted America to produce what was needed at home and not concern itself 
with producing for a larger market.
60
  
The American System faced some opposition. Popular attitudes of the 1820s 
changed as the country became more worried about centralization and opposed to federal 
projects that were built in other sections. South Carolina specifically opposed the 
American System because of the belief that protective tariffs favored the northern 
manufacturing economy. To amend this issue South Carolina attempted nullification in 
1832 by proclaiming all federal laws were unconstitutional when they hampered state’s 
rights. Clay regarded nullifiers as nonsensical; he could not bear the thought of the Union 
dividing. As a manner of unifying people, Clay wanted to present his program so that it 
would inspire economic growth and the general prosperity of the American people. He 
wanted to make the sections interdependent for the purpose of their own wellbeing as 
well as that of the common good. Clay’s intention was to lower prices for the 
manufactured goods, allowing for a stable currency and reasonable credit for economic 
growth. He wanted to promote a vibrant economy based on modern roads and canals. He 
believed that, by joining the country economically, any form of disunion would be 
unthinkable.
61
 
With the American System, Clay hoped to unite the country through internal 
improvements; these improvements also assisted Kentucky. Charters established in 1817 
for the Lexington and Louisville Turnpike Road Company and the Louisville and 
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Maysville Turnpike Road Company defined a standard of roads that would carry on for 
decades. These would provide better transportation and funds for the state. This also 
created a connection between Maysville and Washington which provided jobs and 
quickened travel and set the bar for future projects. The American System encouraged 
other forms of transportation improvements such as railroad building and canals.
62
  
Clay defended the American System faithfully. In a speech to the Senate in 
February 1832, Clay stated that “the danger to our Union does not lie on the side of 
persistence in the American System, but on that of its abandonment.” He said that he 
supported the American System because it provided the poor with employment and 
allowed them to purchase foreign luxuries usually beyond their reach. He acknowledged 
the consistent complaints of South Carolina because it affected foreign imports, but asked 
them to put the good of the country first. He wanted the country to come together on 
neutral ground. According to Clay, abandoning the American System may benefit the 
South but certainly put other sections of the country into ruin so everyone should 
continue to support the American System.
63
 
Clay’s fight against the Tariff of 1832 demonstrated his desire for moderate 
politics to preserve the country’s economic interests. A bill passing through the Senate 
that year caught the attention of many politicians, especially Clay as he was afraid the bill 
was going to overstep its bounds by being too progressive and endangering his American 
System. His goal was to restore higher levies on wool and cotton bagging which would 
help Kentucky’s economy and protect American goods. Suppressing his frustration Clay 
voted against the bill, but the bill passed the Senate. Clay felt the tariff was good since 
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textiles would now sell at a higher rate; however, he believed imports on sugar, iron, 
glass, and cotton bagging were too low.
64
  
Henry Clay made a few political enemies due to his aggressive stance protecting 
American markets. Clay took particular care in aiding Kentucky. Southerners, 
specifically South Carolinian John C. Calhoun, took offense at Clay’s American System, 
claiming that it would injure the southern markets. Calhoun’s animosity towards Clay’s 
economic plan persuaded him to abandon his nationalistic views and cling to states’ 
rights. He drafted a document, “The Exposition and the Protest,” which argued against 
Clay’s brand of nationalism. He claimed an injured state should have the right to nullify 
federal legislation it decided was unconstitutional. This document had a secessionist 
undertone. Clay believed Calhoun’s idea of nullification to be dangerous and ridiculous 
because he did not feel that one state had the right to block legislation that benefited the 
majority. Clay argued national law must be superior to state law. Because of this belief 
Clay avoided Calhoun’s reactionary views as they were detrimental to the Bluegrass 
State’s economic interests.65  
In the time leading up to the Nullification Crisis, Calhoun took careful steps to 
clarify and publicize his position. Believing that he was protecting the South, Calhoun 
and his supporters voted down the Woolens Bill of 1827. He wrote, anonymously, the 
“Exposition of 1828” which argued that the tariff of 1828 was unconstitutional because it 
promoted manufacturing over commerce as well as agriculture which, specifically cotton, 
was the primary economic activity for South Carolina, Calhoun’s home state. Calhoun 
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supported Andrew Jackson’s bid for president in hopes he would tone down the tariff, but 
this was not the case.
66
  
In 1831 Calhoun drafted his “Fort Hill” address restating the doctrine of 
interposition. His views were based on state sovereignty and the ability for a state to 
determine the validity of national legislation. Clay differed from Calhoun because he 
believed in the supremacy of nationalism first. Calhoun believed the tariff abused the 
South and as such it should be deemed unconstitutional. His views frustrated 
protectionists who supported the tariff. Kentucky supporters of protectionism responded. 
Articles published in newspapers such as the Weekly Register in Lexington supported 
Clay’s argument providing information concerning industry, public policy, and 
commerce. State legislatures, such as Kentucky and Louisiana, passed resolutions to 
cultivate domestic trade and support protective tariffs.
67
 
The state of Kentucky elected Clay as a National Republican to the United States 
Senate on November 10
th
, 1831, to fill a vacancy providing him with another opportunity 
to nationally endorse his American System. He provided an explanation for his revision 
of the American System evaluating the status of public debt so that he would cancel the 
tariff on goods not in competition with American products. Trying to accommodate the 
South, Clay hoped this compromise would appease its concerns while preserving the 
protection of American markets. His goal was not to gain a large surplus from the tariff 
but to convince the Treasury to transfer the money from public-land sales to states to 
begin internal improvements. However, this did not mollify southerners whose argument 
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was that the tariff’s impact was detrimental to their economy rather than a blessing.68 
Clay’s attempt at compromise proved his commitment to the nation. He was willing to 
change policy to appease other sections.  
Anti-protectionist feelings became intense over the summer of 1832, particularly 
in South Carolina. In December, South Carolina called a convention and adopted an 
ordinance to nullify the tariff and declare it unconstitutional. South Carolinians set up 
barriers to enforce their new rule. South Carolina threatened to withhold its state officers 
if the government did not acknowledge and respect nullification which could lead to 
secession from the Union.
69
 
President Jackson reacted quickly to the threat by drafting a proclamation to 
South Carolina. On December 11
th, 1832, Jackson stated that the “Union was formed for 
the benefit of all. It was produced by mutual sacrifices of interests and opinions.” The 
document rejected a state’s right to nullify a national decree or to secede from the Union. 
Andrew Jackson warned South Carolina against leaving the Union because “disunion by 
armed force is treason.” While Clay did not care for Jackson’s proclamation, he was 
aware of the dangers of states’ rights rhetoric like South Carolina’s nullification. Some 
protectionists, including many of Clay’s supporters, agreed with the president’s 
proclamation and were encouraged when he stood up to South Carolina. The crisis 
planted seeds of dissension and animosity between different regions of the country.
70
 
Out of the debates with Jackson and his supporters over the national bank, the 
Whig party emerged. The Whig party existed for reasons other than showing opposition 
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to Jackson. Although there were different sections and remnants of the National 
Republican Party, they were able to develop a cohesive political philosophy. The party 
provided a political home for people with different beliefs, including supporters of the 
tariffs, southern planters, and even northern abolitionists. Whigs fundamentally agreed 
that citizens should be educated to make informed decisions and that the government 
should promote economic growth along with national development. The best way to do 
this was through internal improvements and protecting the economy, in similar fashion to 
Clay’s American System, and was just as important as promoting republicanism.71 
The Missouri Compromise of 1820 proved to be a defining moment in Henry 
Clay’s political career. He understood that giving a person time to process thoughts 
would allow emotions to settle and reason to triumph. Clay objected to Maine’s 
admission as a free state, but, before casting his vote, he wanted to know the fate of 
Missouri because he believed it was unfair to place restrictions on Missouri and not 
Maine. With Clay’s suggestion of linking the two states’ admission, southerners in the 
Senate began insisting on the joint admission of Missouri and Maine. Clay assembled a 
thirteen member committee that was to report a resolution to the House. This was an 
unsatisfactory condition and was rejected. Clay reintroduced the bill in the House the 
next day to allow members who had been away a chance to vote. The southern-controlled 
Senate acted as though Missouri was already admitted, while the House did not. On 
behalf of Missouri, Clay took the floor again and convinced the House to discuss the 
resolution. Missouri’s votes did not make a difference. An Illinois senator with southern 
sympathies, Jesse Thomas, came up with a plan. Thomas believed that the 36’ 30’ line 
should be the northern border of slavery, excluding Missouri, for the remainder of the 
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Louisiana Purchase. This could be considered the South’s concession; the North just had 
to admit Missouri as a state. On February 22
nd
, 1820, Clay moved to have a joint 
committee of House and Senate members called to make the final decision for Missouri’s 
fate. The motion passed.  This was Clay’s first great compromise. Linking the admission 
of the two states initiated the compromise by convincing the sections to work together. 
Clay believed in the importance of the Union, and that the failure of the compromise 
would endanger the Union.
72
   
During the winter of 1816 Clay found a specific bill intriguing because it 
promoted the colonization of freed slaves who would be able to use the money from the 
bill to implement a different kind of national improvement. The general thought was to 
fund gradual emancipation, which Clay thought would convince slaveholders to extirpate 
their peculiar institution. He hoped this bill would protect freed slaves from mistreatment 
and allow a transition out of a slaveholding society. Clay sought to find a compromise 
that would appeal to other moderates, even though he did not believe that the federal 
government had the constitutional authority to interfere with slavery in states. He 
believed Congress had the right to abolish slavery in Washington, D.C., along with other 
federal territories. But any type of extremism on slavery concerned Henry Clay. When 
Calhoun attempted to have the Senate automatically table petitions requesting abolition 
of slavery in the District of Columbia, it alarmed Clay. It was also Calhoun’s plan to have 
the post office stop delivering abolitionist material to the South. Clay believed both of 
these extreme measures to be unconstitutional. Actions like these provided a sharp 
contrast to sectional preferences. It was these differences Clay feared because he believed 
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they could slice the Union into sections. Kentucky fell under the influence of Clay’s 
support of this organization and, in 1829, established their own Colonization Society as a 
branch of the national body. As of 1832, Kentucky had thirty-one colonization societies. 
Under Clay’s influence the society did not free slaves, it only assisted those already free 
who were willing to leave the country. Even though there was a group attempting to help 
free blacks, the number of slaves in the state dramatically increased.
73
  
As the Whig party prepared for the election of 1840, Clay hoped for the 
nomination. The Kentucky legislature recommended Clay for president in 1838 which he 
believed to be too early. Nevertheless, he started tempering his views on important 
matters such as the national bank and internal improvements, but Clay had difficulty 
handling the slavery issue. Calhoun raised some questions for Clay during the Twenty-
fifth Congress over this subject. Calhoun had introduced six resolutions in the Senate in 
December 1837 and he viewed the Union as a compact of sovereign states, where the 
states have absolute control over internal affairs. This was a way for Calhoun to protect 
slavery from the federal government. He also claimed that blocking Texas annexation 
was unfair to the South and unconstitutional if done for anti-slavery reasons. After 
Calhoun forced Clay’s hand in stating his stance on slavery, Clay countered him, which 
then erupted into an intense political fight in the Senate.
74
 Clay believed that Calhoun 
only changed sides on subjects for political gain and the preservation of slavery. After 
outbursts and ranting in the Senate, Clay publicly announced that he was finished 
consorting with Calhoun. Both men gave opinions of each other freely. Clay believed that 
Calhoun would “die a traitor or a madman,” while Calhoun exclaimed, “I don’t like 
                                                          
73
 Hidler and Hidler, Henry Clay: The Essential American, 269-272; Harrison and Klotter, A New 
History in Kentucky, 176. 
74
 Hidler and Hidler, Henry Clay: The Essential American, 289-292. 
46 
 
Henry Clay.” Calhoun believed Clay to be “a bad man, an impostor, a creator of wicked 
schemes,” and he swore he “wouldn’t speak to” him again. Clay believed he had a 
fighting chance to gain the Whig party nomination of 1840, but there were some 
unforeseeable circumstances that would prevent this from coming to fruition.
75
  
The new Tariff of 1842 aimed to restore taxation rates back to those set in 1833 as 
reductions had been made over the past nine years. Henry Clay openly supported the 
Tariff, defending it from potential revisions by other House members. Clay wrote a letter 
to Fred J. Cope in 1844 attempting to clarify his opinion on the Tariff of 1842 wherein he 
explained that his opinion remained the same throughout. He did not believe in adjusting 
the tariff for revenue and argued that the tariff had both benefited the country and 
operated well. Clay emphatically wrote that “I AM UTTERLY OPPOSED TO ITS 
REPEAL.”  On April 13th, 1844, Henry Clay gave a speech in Raleigh, North Carolina, 
declaring the Tariff of 1842 to be beneficial to the country. This tariff turned the “balance 
of foreign trade in our favor.” Clay found the Tariff of 1842 to be significant as it, like his 
American System, promoted better trade for America.
76
 
Ratified into law on July 30th, 1846, the Tariff of 1846, also referred to as the 
Walker Tariff, advocated moderate protection instead of free trade and remained in effect 
until 1857. Clay did not find this tariff to be in the best interest of the country. In a letter 
to Henry White of Lexington, Clay wrote, “I think our true policy is to go for its repeal, 
and the restoration of the Tariff of 1842, and nothing else than the repeal of the one and 
the restoration of the other.”  In another letter to Albro, Hoyt & Co. in Elizabethtown, 
New Jersey, Clay expressed his concerns about the Tariff of 1846 because it could bring 
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“great injury to the general business of the country, and ultimately to the revenue of the 
government.” Clay did not like the notion of the government having a large deficit; he 
was always looking out for the betterment of the Union.
77
  
After his failed bids for the presidency, Clay returned to the Senate. He served 
another term from March 4
th
, 1849, until his death in Washington, D.C., on June 29
th
, 
1852. Henry Clay, even at this point, was known as the Great Compromiser because he 
moderately served his country during controversial times. He pacified sections of the 
country while attempting to convince them that the Union was overall more important 
than the needs of individual states. During this time he dealt with the controversy of the 
expansion of slavery into new territories. In 1846, President Polk had asked for an 
appropriation of two million dollars, but David Wilmot tried to attach a proviso to it 
prohibiting slavery into the territory. The proviso did not pass but it created a hot political 
issue. The decision to admit California as a state as well as the slavery issue as a whole 
dominated the Senate floor 1849-1850. Once more Clay felt compelled to step in and 
play an important mediator role to assist his Union.
78
 
On January 29
th
, 1850, Clay addressed Congress in an attempt to preserve the 
Union through compromise. Clay recognized the importance of state individualism 
saying, “we have seen this republic of thirteen States swelling into thirty States, and each 
State exerting her power in all the forms of social improvement.” Clay also understood 
the risk of losing the nation stating, “shall we see this Union broken up, and the grandest 
experiment which has ever been made in the annals of man, suddenly arrested by the 
voice of fanaticism or the torch of discord?” Clay tried to convince Congress of the 
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severity of this issue stating, “there is but one rock on which the Union may be split, and 
that to avoid that fatal shipwreck, we shall require all the energies, all the nerve, all the 
moral courage, all the prudence, all that spirit of conciliation and compromise, which 
carried us through the war of 76’ and established the constitution of 87’.”79 
Clay proposed a series of resolutions which he hoped would reconcile northern 
and southern interests. First, Clay recommended California’s admission to the Union 
without Congressional action concerning slavery. Next, Clay proposed the establishment 
of a territorial government for the remaining portion acquired from Mexico, again, 
without the discussion of slavery. Clay advocated defining the boundaries for Texas and 
the federal government assuming the state’s debts. Next, Clay recommended the District 
of Columbia abolish the slave trade. The South would gain a more effective fugitive slave 
law and Congress would have no power over the domestic slave trade. Henry Clay 
ardently pleaded with his peers to set aside sectional differences and exercise moderation 
and devotion to the Union. After a dispute from Calhoun, the bill did not pass, but Henry 
Clay worked tirelessly to later pass each individual section.
 80
  
The Compromise of 1850 was Henry Clay’s last attempt to save his beloved 
Union. Clay believed that the sovereign states would benefit from the partnership of the 
Union and must also bear the burden of the other states. “Let us not deceive ourselves. 
We must compromise the controversy by amicable arrangements…It is conciliation and 
compromise which have brought this Union together, and must continue to knit it 
together. In this spirit the Union will remain the proudest monument which man has ever 
erected, and our country attain a pitch of prosperity which has never been equalled [sic] 
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in the world.”  Clay favored compromise to preserve the Union, an approach later used 
by Kentucky during the secession crisis.
81
  
 Henry Clay proved to be a moderate politician primarily focused on the Union 
and employed a political strategy of compromise for its betterment. He found success 
utilizing this political strategy both in the Missouri Compromise and the Compromise of 
1850 as well as to make the American System palatable to the nation. Clay’s moderate 
politics led to a feeling and belief of Unionism during the secession crisis.  The general 
definition of a Unionist, according to Daniel W. Crofts, was the group “who opposed 
secession.” Moderates or Unionists were willing to be flexible and compromise as long as 
they could keep the particular institution that was important to them. Although there were 
different types of Unionists during the secession crisis they were willing to remain in the 
Union as long as possible in order to preserve their way of life and economic viability. 
Because of Henry Clay, many in Kentucky believed self-preservation depended on 
staying within the Union and would later employ Clay’s political strategy of compromise 
to achieve that goal. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
AN UNCOMMITTED STATE AFFECTED BY SECESSION 
 
The state of Kentucky was at a crossroads. Abraham Lincoln treated Kentucky 
carefully in 1861 because he recognized the state’s importance and position. Kentucky’s 
leaders were split over whether to remain loyal to the Union or to secede. Some leaders 
were in favor of the Union because they believed staying was the best way to protect their 
economic interests. To secede meant to enter into an unstable new nation built on the 
Deep South’s form of slavery. Kentucky’s decision was a matter of such importance to 
Abraham Lincoln that he wrote to a friend, stating, “I think to lose Kentucky is nearly the 
same as to lose the whole game.”82 Lincoln knew that pushing Kentucky would be a poor 
political move and would cost him greatly.  
In the antebellum South, slavery promoted a specific set of political values and 
practices.  Kentucky exhibited these values in 1849 when the legislature passed a law that 
affirmed the “right of property is before and higher than any constitutional sanction.” The 
specific property mentioned refers to slaves. Kentuckians sided with the party that was 
going to help their whole economy prosper. 
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Kentucky had three major political parties during the first half of the nineteenth 
century, the Whigs, the Know-Nothings, and the Democrats. The Democrats had the most 
influence during the 1850s. The Whig Party disappeared in 1854 due to its inability to 
address the issues of slavery and nativism. The Republican Party, representing new 
northern opposition, eventually replaced the northern Whigs. Although the Republican 
Party was known in the South, it did not have a strong presence in Kentucky because of 
its adamant opposition to slavery’s expansion and denigration of the practice of 
slaveholding in general.  For Kentucky the deciding issue was which candidate and party 
would take care of its economy in 1860.
83
   
The Whig party was the dominant political force from 1832 to 1851.  Henry 
Clay's efforts to promote nationalism during the Compromise of 1850 benefited the Whig 
party's political power.  Even later, with the collapse of the Whig party as a national 
political power, Whig ideology continued to be strong within the state of Kentucky. Due 
to the force of nativism and the strong antislavery sentiments of the northern Whigs, the 
majority of the party split and aligned with the Know-Nothings.
84
   
By the mid-1850s, the Whig party lost control of political power in Kentucky due 
to a division between the northern and southern wings over slavery. Northern Whigs were 
deemed too antislavery in the eyes of the southern Whigs. This division allowed for a 
new political party, the Know-Nothings, to emerge in Kentucky. The Know-Nothings 
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claimed to be the party of the American-born Protestant working man. The Know-
Nothings were fearful of immigrants, specifically the Democratic-leaning Roman 
Catholic Irishmen, whom they believed were going to undermine American society.
85
   
Like the Whigs before them, the Know-Nothings had a difficult time maintaining 
their popularity because of the slavery issue. They were forced to decide on slavery’s 
expansion, but the northern and southern divisions of the party could not agree: the 
southern members approved the Missouri Compromise while the northerners disapproved 
of it. The Democrats put the Know-Nothings under extreme pressure by equating the 
Know-Nothing Party with abolitionism and free-soil ideology. In 1856 the Know-
Nothings ran their only presidential candidate, Millard Fillmore, with vice-presidential 
candidate Andrew Jackson Donelson. They intended to capture votes from both old 
Whigs and new Know-Nothings; however, the Know-Nothing Party’s attempt failed and 
resulted in its demise. Many northern ex-Whigs joined the Republican Party. Ex-Whigs 
who did not align with Republicans joined the Constitutional Unionist Party. By the 1860 
presidential election, the Know-Nothings ceased to exist in Kentucky, and thus no formal 
opposition party existed in Kentucky in 1859-1860.
86
  
Democrats had a considerable following in Kentucky because their platforms 
tended to be pro-southern. However the Democrats were not a majority party because 
Kentucky generally held to Clay’s American System. The Democrats triumphed over the 
Know-Nothing Party with James Buchanan who received fifty-six percent of Kentucky’s 
popular vote as well as the electoral votes in the 1856 election. The Democrats succeeded 
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by declaring that the Republicans were radically opposed to both slavery’s expansion and 
the particular institution in general. Democrats demanded strict observation of the 
Fugitive Slave Law. They also believed the Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854) was just in its 
repeal of the Missouri Compromise of 1820, and they also defended the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty.
87
   
Southerners felt that the spread of slavery was threatened by the emergence of the 
Republican Party and its goals. The Republicans aligned themselves with the Wilmot 
Proviso and its goal of stopping the expansion of slavery. During the 1850s, the 
Republicans opposed the Kansas-Nebraska Act, seeing it as a means for planters to 
reinstate the practice locally overriding control from the federal government. Republicans 
competed with the Democrats for free states in 1856, but lost the election; nonetheless, 
they won all but five of the northern states. Southerners feared Republicans would soon 
sweep all the states of the North and win the presidency. Southerners believed that once 
Republicans had control of the federal government, they would override state laws and 
customs, especially and particularly in regard to slaveholding.
88
   
The results of the 1860 presidential election revealed how Kentuckians felt about 
potential candidates and platforms of Abraham Lincoln, Steven Douglas, John C. 
Breckinridge, and John Bell. In the 1860 presidential election, Lincoln received only 
1,364 popular votes from Kentucky out of the 146,216 cast.  Kentucky voters disagreed 
with Lincoln’s Republican platform of restricting slavery to states where it currently 
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existed and preventing expansion.
89
 The Republican Party disagreed with the re-opening 
of the African Slave Trade. They viewed it as “a crime against humanity and a burning 
shame to our country and age.” The Republican goal was to permanently dispose of the 
slave trade. These were not the principles to win the state of Kentucky as it impacted the 
wallets of many residents who participated in the slave trade.
90
 
 Northern Democratic candidate, Stephen Douglas, took the third place position in 
Kentucky with 25,651 votes. Douglas and Breckinridge, both Democrats, agreed on the 
majority of the party's platform however they were divided on the issue of slavery. 
Breckinridge favored a territorial slave code which would grant the constitutional right to 
slave owners to hold slaves in territories whereas Douglas preferred popular sovereignty 
which would allow territories to decide based on popular vote. Ultimately, the 
Democratic Party resolved to abide by the Supreme Court decision concerning 
constitutional law.
91
   
John Bell carried a presence in Kentucky with 66,058 votes, 12,915 votes over 
Breckinridge. The Constitutional Union Party believed it should protect the principles of 
public liberty and national safety from every enemy local or foreign. The Unionists 
wanted domestic peace and liberty for everyone. Unlike the Republicans and Democrats 
of the time, the Constitutional Unionists avoided taking a direct position on slavery. 
Breckinridge’s National Democratic Platform promoted the belief that U.S. citizens 
should be allowed to settle with their property in a territory without government 
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impeding their rights. Also, when those territories became states, the citizens would be 
allowed to retain their slaves, “whether its Constitution prohibits or recognizes the 
institution of Slavery.” Breckinridge aligned with his party’s platform, believing there 
should be enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law and governmental protection of 
slaveholders.
92
  
The different geographical sections of Kentucky voted for specific candidates.  
The Constitutional Unionist party carried the most votes in the sections of dominant 
slaveholding and commercial interests, such as tobacco-heavy central Kentucky, near the 
Cumberland Valley.  The majority of the northern border of Kentucky voted for Bell 
because of its dependence on northern businesses. The eastern mountainous region of 
Kentucky, rich in coal, salt, and timber, cast its votes for Breckinridge because they 
identified with the states’ rights issues. This group proved to be deeply devoted to the 
Union later. Kentucky was divided by the economic interests of the North and the 
political interests of the South.
93
   
 Why did the majority of Kentucky side with John Bell over one of their own, 
John C. Breckinridge? Republican Senator Chandler of Michigan answered that question 
in a speech published in the National Republican newspaper. He responded to the claims 
of Breckinridge’s friends that Breckinridge was a man for the Union. Chandler stated that 
“in the State of Kentucky that the contest was, who was the soundest upon the Union 
question: who would stand by the Union the longest; who was prepared to shed his blood 
for it if need be?” Senator Chandler went on to discredit Breckinridge and proclaim that 
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he could not speak for Kentucky; Breckinridge could not claim that Kentucky had 
intentions of leaving the Union as long as she was guaranteed her rights by the Union. 
Kentuckians were looking for a candidate that would preserve their comfortable life. Bell 
was not going to take away slavery and wanted to keep the Union intact. Historians were 
not surprised by Kentucky’s actions because the state was influenced by the moderate 
compromising politics of Henry Clay. Kentuckians tended to vote for the candidate that 
would promote Kentucky’s interests.94 
 
Ultimately the 1860 national election went to the Republicans. Lincoln received 
180 electoral votes out of 303 with almost forty percent of the popular vote.  Bell 
received fewer than thirteen percent of the popular vote which produced only thirty nine 
electoral votes. Lincoln managed to win the election without the support of the South, 
including Kentucky which would later become a state of great significance to Lincoln as 
the Secession Crisis began. 
On December 20
th
, 1860, the secessionist convention of South Carolina signed the 
petition to withdraw from the Union. After this act, South Carolina sent out delegates to 
persuade others to join her crusade. Following the example of South Carolina, six more 
states seceded from the Union before Lincoln’s inauguration. Mississippi, Florida, 
Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas all left the Union between January and February 
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of 1861. These states then turned their attention to the border states, specifically the 
fertile grounds of Kentucky.
95
 
Pro-secessionists and Unionists intensely debated each other in Kentucky between 
December 1860 and May 1861.  Kentuckians from both parties as well as outsiders 
leveraged multiple forms of media to influence citizens.  Kentuckians employed Clay's 
politically moderate temperament of compromise instead of aligning with either side 
which effectively divided the state. 
Kentuckians, like other southerners in the border states, had a fear of 
emancipation dating from the 1840s. Kentucky's constitution protected the institution of 
slavery.  The vast majority of Kentuckians did not want that to change, feeling that blacks 
were inferior and incapable of acting responsibly if freed.  Economically it was in 
Kentucky's interest to maintain slave labor.
96
  
An anti-slavery movement had swept through states such as Kentucky, Western 
Virginia, and Tennessee in the 1820s causing many slaveholders to contemplate setting 
their bondservants free. This was largely an evangelical movement that lost fervor in the 
1830s because of the radical viewpoint it took. Its position was to immediately terminate 
slavery in the states and condemn the owners, calling the practice a sin.  This aggressive 
position proved to be too extreme for these states and the movement eventually 
disappeared.
97
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The election of 1860 is a perfect illustration of lingering devotion to Clayite 
politics in Kentucky. An overwhelming fear permeated in the South concerning the 
emancipation of slaves. Kentuckians had specifically taken measures to protect the 
institution in their constitution.  Another evangelical campaign against slavery surged 
during the 1840s and 50s and proclaimed slavery to be immoral and ruinous to the social 
framework of Kentucky.  While the movement claimed that slavery weakened societal 
structures, Kentucky continued to maintain significant economic interests in the practice 
and felt compelled to protect it. Under the new constitution, 1799 in slavery could not be 
eliminated without the consent of slaveholders.
98
  
When the anti-slavery movement again reemerged during the late 1840s and 
1850s, northern propaganda aggressively attacked the institution of slavery. Anti-slavery 
Christians began teaching young children the error of the southern way by word 
association when learning their ABC’s. “A is an Abolitionist, D is the Driver, cold and 
stern, W is the Whipping post.” Abolitionists wanted to spread their way of thinking to 
northern children in order to encourage them to speak out against slavery to others. 
Hymns documented abolitionists’ tales of poorly treated slaves which became common 
reading literature. Their goal was to appeal to emotions. Another avenue of spreading 
abolitionist sentiment was to draw direct distinctions between classes. They portrayed the 
wealthy planter class negatively asserting they were the people who could afford an 
education but refused to support public schools. Anti-slavery groups also targeted the 
concepts of Christianity and morality to gain sympathy for their movement. Pamphlets 
told of the moral desolation that took place in the South. The abuse of African women by 
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evil white masters was prominent and unstoppable with the continuance of slavery. Their 
goal was to link immorality to slavery and it was achieved.
99
  
Kentucky held sympathy for its southern sister states when the particular 
institution became endangered.  In many ways, Kentucky was a southern state interested 
in preserving the institution of slavery as it made economic sense; however, it would not 
break up the country by secession just because of Lincoln’s election. A man who voiced 
his concern about secession was J. W. Crockett.  Crockett was comfortable with armed 
neutrality but believed Kentucky needed to remain loyal to the Union.  If it came to 
Kentucky deciding to part, Crockett wanted the state remembered as “the last to shake 
hands with the Goddess of Liberty.”  Crockett understood that in times of turmoil cool 
thinking and discreet action were positive traits.  He urged his listeners to “think calmly” 
as the events emerge “act with patriotism.”100 
Influential outsiders and politicians promoted pro-secessionist ideas in Kentucky. 
In his “Cornerstone Address” Alexander H. Stephens, a former senator from Georgia and 
Vice President of the Confederate States of America urged the border states, due to their 
similar institutions, “to join us.”  He believed that the South held a superior way of life 
and that southerners needed to be true to their cause.  Stephens proclaimed that the 
“cornerstone rests, upon the great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that 
slavery, subordination to the superior race, is his natural and moral condition.”  Stephens 
believed that the border states could survive and flourish if they formed an alliance with 
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the deeper South states.
101
  Advocates of secession from southern states were a tool of 
secession.  In all there were approximately fifty-two men who sought to incite secession.  
These men were judges, doctors, or lawyers who were known for their speaking skills.  
The advocates provided a compelling argument asking people to consider the option of 
secession.  The Deep South states sent promoters of their cause to construct a campaign 
and bombard Kentucky to cultivate secessionist ideals in an attempt to force them to 
make a decision to secede.
102
  
The goal of the secessionist argument was to touch on the topics sensitive to 
Kentuckians and to persuade them to stick with their southern sister states. Newspapers 
of the time reflect the mindset of the average Kentuckian. The Louisville Daily Courier 
was a primarily secessionist newspaper which presented its readers with arguments of 
economics and loyalty to promote secession. In one editorial the author proclaimed that 
the North built railroads with southern money; the South created wealth but the North 
grabbed it via taxation. “Give us the purse and you may keep the sword,” the article read; 
southerners believed this was a frequent northern statement meaning the North only 
wanted the South for its money. The author believed that the South had the “purse” used 
against them for some time. He stated that the South had borne the burden except for the 
North adding “insult to injury”. According to the author, the North was teaching its 
children to hate the South because of the institution of slavery and the treatment of 
African Americans. He stated that there “is no longer virtue in forbearance on the part of 
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the South.” A separate editorial in August of that year did not blame South Carolina for 
seceding but applauded the sincerity of her people.  The author criticized Kentucky 
because of the cowardice displayed in refusing to take sides.
 103 
Leaders in Kentucky did not agree on how to handle the secession crisis. They 
were as divided as the people. The New York Times wrote an article about John C. 
Breckinridge speaking at a secessionist barbecue in Madison County, Kentucky. In his 
speech Breckinridge urged his fellow Kentuckians to resist the laws of the United States 
with respect to the tariff and war tax, which the government was levying upon citizens. 
Breckinridge encouraged Kentuckians to support the seceded states by giving them “aid 
and comfort.”104 Another influential Kentucky leader, Governor Beriah Magoffin, 
harbored secessionist sympathies. He felt that secession was legal and believed that 
coercing seceded states back into the Union was illegal. Magoffin’s solution for 
Kentucky came January 17
th
, 1861, when he advocated to the General Assembly that 
Kentucky should secede from the Union. Magoffin feared that the Republicans were 
"destructive to [the South's] rightful equality as States." He believed that Republicans 
would prove to be "fatal to our stability and security of our whole social organization." 
Magoffin thought that they would lead the Union towards disrespecting property, slavery, 
leading towards abolition. It was Magoffin’s belief that Kentucky would fight for its 
rights, freedom, and honor with or without the Union.
105
  
The South proved to be extremely aggressive in its use of propaganda to affect 
Kentuckians.  Northern Unionists were equally capable at messaging its agenda as well. 
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Concerning the argument against secession, other states such as Missouri interjected its 
opinion. Missouri’s Democratic Governor, Claiborne Jackson, believed Missouri had lost 
as many slaves as the other states combined. Governor Jackson stated in a speech that he 
“deprecates the action of South Carolina, and says our people would feel more sympathy 
with the movement had it originated amongst those who; like ourselves, had suffered 
severe loss by constant annoyance from outsiders.” Jackson went on to state that Missouri 
would hold its position in the Union as long as it was worth the effort of preservation.  
The Missouri governor denied any state the right of secession as he believed it would 
ultimately destroy the nation. Jackson continued to urge people to take power from the 
selfish politicians and hold steadfast to the Union while it desired to be the protector of 
equal rights. This speech appeared in the newspaper to encourage Kentuckians to remain 
in the Union.
106
 
On November 12
th
, 1860, Leslie Combs, a Unionist supporter from Kentucky, 
gave a speech which was reported in a newspaper article, declaring that “to stand by the 
Union is the only hope of preservation.” He believed “under the Federal Constitution the 
state possesses no right either to secede from the Union or to nullify a law of 
Congress.”107 Another outspoken Kentucky citizen, Captain James Jackson of Christian 
County, gave a powerful speech for the “American Union” and he was completely 
“opposed to the disruption” of the government. His belief was that the border states lost a 
considerable amount of freedom but endured wrong with patience.  Jackson was another 
individual who openly displayed his disgust for the actions of South Carolina. He did not 
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believe South Carolina had given a true reason for its actions. Captain Jackson did not 
believe secession was an answer.
108
   
Robert J. Breckinridge wrote a pamphlet in January of 1861 giving a religious 
argument against secession. He disputed claims that Kentucky shared a common interest 
with the slave states. Breckinridge felt the Upper South, including Kentucky, did not 
share the economic system of the cotton states. He thought Kentucky should remain loyal 
to the Union and that slavery should not be a factor in secession. He claimed there were 
not enough slaves to cause concern and that Kentucky could do what they wanted with 
slaves “without being obliged, by reason of it, to resort to any desperate expedient, in any 
direction.” Breckinridge believed that in order to save the Union the slavery issue must 
be extinguished. John Bell advocated that Kentucky remain in the Union and fight “under 
the stars and stripes” for the Union. He categorized nullifiers as traitors and harshly 
criticized South Carolina for its actions of secession.
109
   
Senator John J. Crittenden spoke numerous times about the evils of a war for 
abolition. Crittenden wrote to his friend, Mr. Sedgwick of New York, in 1861 expressing 
his distaste of the current political situation. Crittenden refused to carry on a war to free 
slaves. Crittenden went on to say that “I must leave the task of prosecuting an abolition 
war against their own race for the liberation of the slaves held by them under all the 
sanction of constitution and law.” With these arguments the Unionists writers hoped to 
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convince border states to switch their allegiance. In Kentucky, along with Maryland and 
Delaware, state legislatures refused to call state conventions to discuss secession.
110
  
The Secessionists saw strategic value in winning Kentucky over to the 
South.  They argued that the state would benefit more in a southern government than 
remaining in the Union.  Leaders such as Magoffin and Breckinridge felt that Kentucky 
also fundamentally did not have strong ties to the North and, if push came to shove, 
Kentuckians would fight for “self first, State second, and Union last.”111  
Pro-Unionists proposed the idea that secessionists were traitors.  Pro-Unionists 
also stated that Kentucky could preserve their use of slavery in the state while remaining 
in the Union.  Finally, leaders like Leslie Combs and Captain James Jackson believed that 
states simply did not have the right to secede. 
Despite the debates between Secessionists and Unionists, by April 1861, 
Kentucky still had not chosen a side. Instead Kentucky held a convention to create 
another solution adhering to their tradition of political neutrality. However, Kentucky had 
to contend with an internal debate from the now-prominent activist group, the Knights of 
the Golden Circle.  
George Bickley and a small group of followers founded The Knights of the 
Golden Circle on July 4th, 1854, in Lexington, Kentucky, with the goals of secession and 
protection of slave labor. This organization planned to lead the world's production of 
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cotton, tobacco, rice, sugar, and coffee with the help of slave labor. The Golden Circle 
hoped to establish an empire drawn by a 1,200 mile radius circle centering on Havana. 
This empire would include Maryland, Kentucky, southern Missouri, portions of Kansas, 
and Texas as well as parts of Old Mexico, Central America, South America, and the West 
Indies. The Knights of the Golden Circle hoped that by annexing other slave territories 
for the United States it would strengthen the South's position in the Union. Ultimately the 
group was deemed too extreme by Kentucky's legislature. In order for the state to be 
perceived as moderate, it had to disassociate itself from the Secessionist principles of the 
Knights of the Golden Circle.
112
  
Unionists feared for the safety of the Union instead of ensuring the safety of 
slavery. Unionism existed in the Upper South in states like Kentucky, Virginia, 
Tennessee, North Carolina, Delaware, Missouri, and Maryland. From these states three 
distinct types of Unionists emerged; absolute or unconditional, anticoercionist or 
extended ultimatumist, and fast ultimatumist. These groups had differing opinions on 
how to repair the Union but the majority of Unionists generally shared five common 
beliefs. First, the economic interests of the Upper South would significantly suffer if they 
were to join the CSA due to the differing forms of slavery. Second, Unionists believed 
that Secessionists used fear mongering to generate alarm and encourage others to join 
their cause. Third, most Unionists believed secession to not be realistic. Fourth, southern 
misunderstanding of northern intentions brought them to the impending conflict. Lastly, 
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they considered the Republican Party the only instrument that could correct the 
misunderstanding and redirect the nation away from war.
113
 
Each of the groups had conditions for remaining in the Union. Anticoercionists 
would stay with the Union unless the North attempted to wage war on the South. This 
group believed that the Upper South would secede if or when the North chose to deploy 
troops against the seceded states. Extended ultimatumists would remain in the Union 
until all hope and reasoning for a resolution was gone. Many Virginians fell under this 
section. Extended ultimatumists were specifically concerned with the constitutional claim 
of slaveholders expanding their peculiar institution into a few of the federal territories. If 
the Union violated slaveholder’s intentions to expand slavery, then the states in the lower 
South would leave the Union. The strength of conditional Unionist sentiment was able to 
delay Virginia in her decision for over five months after Lincoln's election. Virginia 
remained in the Union for two months after the formation of the Confederate States of 
America. The conditional Unionists of Virginia remained until they were provoked by the 
president’s actions against the seceded states.114  
Men like Dr. Richard Eppes, a slave-holding conditional Unionist of Virginia, 
would rather remain in an old Union than venture into a new Confederacy. Dr. Eppes 
described himself as "a moderate man in my views, preferring the old Confederacy to a 
new if the South can have her rights guaranteed[,] but if not feeling that our only hope 
must be in another Union as a last resort." His statement reflected the belief of most 
Virginia conditional Unionists during that time. Several conditional Unionists became 
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reluctant secessionists in March because of the failed attempt to secure a sectional 
compromise on slavery at a Washington Peace Conference. The last hope of Virginia’s 
alliance with the Union vanished after the incident with Fort Sumter in April and 
Lincoln’s call for troops. A man met Eppes at his door asking for his signature on the 
ordinance of secession for Virginia. Eppes signed the document stating that he had "lost 
all hopes of our Union with the Northern States since President Lincoln has adopted the 
policy of coercion of the seceeded states." Virginia seceded April 17
th
, 1861. This was 
significant to Kentucky because, according to the 1860s census, the highest number of 
emigrants in Kentucky came from Virginia.
115
 
Conditional Unionists existed in the border slave states due to President Lincoln’s 
influence. Lincoln did not want to be perceived as overly aggressive on slavery as it 
would alienate the slaveholders causing them to side with their brethren of the Deep 
South. If leadership remained temperate and patient, as Clay taught, rational thinking 
would win out. Lincoln also understood the strategic importance of Kentucky in case of 
war. The Ohio River is the northern border which would allow for travel and transport of 
supplies or troops in the event of war. Kentucky was also fertile with supplies that would 
be useful. The uncommitted border state of Kentucky proved to be of critical importance 
to Lincoln’s overall strategy and, due in part to her ambivalent politics surrounding the 
Union and the Confederacy, merited careful consideration from the President. 
Governor Beriah Magoffin called a special session of the Kentucky House of 
Representatives on May 6
th, 1861, to discuss Kentucky’s position on secession. “Let us 
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not attempt to employ our official power thus acquired to control this mighty question,” 
Magoffin stated in his address. “Rather let us provide a legal and orderly mode for a full, 
deliberate, and final disposition, by the people themselves, of their own destinies.”116  
The goal of the legislature was to allow for the people to decide their own fate, 
instead of making decisions for Kentucky citizens. On the second day of this session, 
several representatives brought forth petitions and pleas of women from their counties 
who were “praying that Kentucky maintain inviolate and armed neutrality.”117 Nine out 
of 120 counties had women asking for Kentucky to continue with protected neutrality. 
The secession also dealt with other matters, such as the House needing to be privy to the 
Governor’s correspondence with the government of the Confederate States of America 
and Governor Magoffin obtaining arms for Kentucky.
118
  
A resolution of neutrality passed in the House reading “The General 
Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky have asserted strict 
neutrality to be the position desirable for the state to occupy in the present 
contest between the Federal Government and the seceding States; 
therefore the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky 
asserts that this position will be maintained with sincerity and honor by the 
State; that the parties engaged in the present fratricidal war should respect 
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this neutrality, and know that Kentucky cannot with honor to herself 
submit to armed forces hostile to the neutrality invading her soil.”119 
It took until Tuesday, May 21
st
, 1861, for Mr. Nathaniel Wolfe to request that it 
be amended with an investigation into the Knights of the Golden Circle seeking the 
following: the organization’s purpose, details on the members, clarification if the 
members were under contract to oppose the US government, identification of any 
members within the legislative body, and finally full disclosure from the Governor of 
Kentucky regarding any secret correspondence he has had especially with representatives 
from seceded states. The committee must know if the Governor had promised 
Kentuckians to fight for the CSA or allow Confederate troops to enter Kentucky. The 
amendment passed with a large majority favoring neutrality and seeing the value of 
keeping the Governor in check.
120
  
The decision passed on May 16
th
, 1861, for the state of Kentucky to not secede 
and rather to remain strictly neutral.  The state realized its economic interests would 
benefit the most remaining uncommitted to either side and speeches of Kentucky’s 
leaders at the time reflect this opinion.  The presence of armed forces from either the 
Union of the Confederacy would be viewed as an invasion. 
It is clear that Kentucky came to the vote for neutrality because it was a divided 
state. Despite political leaders from both sides, the state’s economic interests forced the 
state to not participate in the struggle with which the rest of the country was involved. It 
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seems that “no policy could have accorded more closely with the mixed feelings 
engendered by Kentucky’s Southern heritage and the legacy of Henry Clay.”121 
Neutrality was also advantageous for Kentuckians because it allowed them to be safe and 
stay out of the conflict while pursuing their own interests. In the resolution of neutrality 
Kentucky asked to defend its “right of friendly intercourse and trade with both sections” 
not allowing either government to possess authority over its possessions or property 
within Kentucky borders.
122
 
Neutrality was beneficial for Kentucky’s economy because of its location. The 
Louisville and Nashville railroads were critical in maintaining their intersectional trade. 
This trade aided in enforcing Kentucky’s neutrality during the spring and early summer. 
Federal authorities were lenient on Kentucky concerning the trade because they wanted to 
keep a good relationship. Remaining in the United States allowed the state to trade freely 
with the northern states and a policy of neutrality prevented the federal government from 
ceasing trade with the Confederacy which further helped Kentucky’s economy flourish 
throughout the summer of 1861. Even after Congress banned trade with the Confederacy, 
Lincoln allowed Kentucky to continue trade with some exceptions. Lincoln delicately 
handled matters with Kentucky in the hope of swaying the state towards the Union.
 123
  
For Kentuckians to take a stand and side with a section during the war they 
needed to carefully consider their options and decide who would benefit them more.  An 
editorial published in the Louisville Daily Courier, a secessionist newspaper, tried to 
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persuade Kentucky to side with the southern states with the guarantee of lower tariffs.  
The author claimed, “the difference to the Southern consumer would be, that the tax 
would be much less than at the present, while the incidental protection it would give to 
the manufactures would serve to build up our own cities and contribute to the prosperity 
of our friends, instead of enriching our enemies.”124  
After the 1860 election, an argument began in Kentucky to select a side, after the 
neutrality vote, because many did not believe that neutrality was a sustainable option. A 
speech published in the Jeffersonian newspaper encouraged Kentucky to make a 
decision.  The speaker compared neutrality to “a snake in the grass of rebellion…sooner 
or later those who handle it will feel its fangs.”  The speaker was a Unionist who 
condemned Kentucky, openly mocking its people to obtain a demonstration of faith 
toward the Union.  He proclaimed that the governor, Governor Magoffin, was hostile to 
Unionism and favorable to the welfare of Kentucky.  An editorial published in the 
Louisville Daily Courier stated that neutrality was “hypocrisy for Kentucky” because it 
supported the Union by contributing men and money.  That author did not believe 
neutrality could be maintained and that Kentucky needed to be prepared to choose who to 
aid.  Another editorial stated that “If Kentucky has any future before her she will act now, 
firmly and heroically.” They believed that the revolution was upon them, and they had no 
time to waste.  That editor thought that the South needed to respond in action together.  
The general consensus of this newspaper was that neutrality was ignoble and had run its 
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course.  Neutrality was only a temporary avoidance to war, and Kentucky needed to take 
a stand.
125
 
National politics evolved during the Secession Crisis from December 1860 to 
June 1861.  Kentucky voted against secession when it threatened its industries; however 
political loyalties within the state remained divided.  Strong-minded Kentuckians and 
political leaders frequently pointed out the regional and political reasons to side with 
either the Union or the Confederacy.  Regardless Kentucky adhered to Clay's political 
philosophy of moderation, opting to resist aligning with either side while still enjoying 
the fruits of the Union industries and the benefits of slave trading in the 
Confederacy.  Kentucky continued to benefit economically by riding the thin line 
between the Union and the Confederacy. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
CONCLUSION: THE INVASION OF KENTUCKY 
 
During the Secession Crisis, Kentucky remained uniquely unaligned to either the 
Union or the Confederacy despite significant pressure from both sides.  The state realized 
financial benefits by remaining politically neutral and this position evolved from multiple 
events from the state’s history. After giving an account of these events that eventually 
forced Kentucky to select a side there will be a summary of what was discussed during 
this thesis within each chapter as well as what other historians believe about Kentucky’s 
choice. 
Even after the powerful attempts at persuasion from both Confederate and 
Unionist delegates, the Kentucky government remained moderate and neutral in the 
developing conflict between the North and South. Kentuckians maintained a lucrative 
trade policy between both sides, proving that they favored their own economic interests 
over nationalism. This was the primary reason that Kentucky favored neutrality for as 
long as possible. Kentucky’s neutrality remained intact until the Confederate invasion by 
General Polk from Tennessee in September 1861 forced Kentucky to align with the 
Union to protect its stronger economic interests. 
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General Leonidas Polk broke Kentucky neutrality with the Confederate forces on 
September 3
rd
 when they entered the state first.  Kentucky’s legislature proclaimed the 
Confederates to be invaders.  Polk sent General Gideon J. Pillow to seize Columbus, 
Kentucky because it was regarded as the “key to the Mississippi River.”  At the news of 
the Confederate invasion, the Kentucky legislature responded by discarding neutrality 
and declaring full allegiance to the United States.  Kentuckians believed their sovereign 
and neutral position was violated.  The state felt threatened by the Confederacy’s action 
and needed to secure the safety of its people.  Joining the Union would offer Kentucky 
economic safety.
126
   
Jefferson Davis argued that the Union invaded Kentucky first. He stated, “the 
federal forces have not only refused to acknowledge her right to be neutral, and have 
insisted upon making her a party to the war, but have invaded her for the purpose of 
attack the Confederate States.” According to Davis, he received information about the 
invasion of the Confederacy through Kentucky in September of 1861 and he was 
outraged at the thought of Kentucky being deceived, unarmed, and unnecessarily secured 
by the federal forces. 
 
He sent the Confederate army into Kentucky by way of Polk to 
prevent Union occupation of such a venerable state. Jefferson also feared that allowing 
the Union to settle in Kentucky would give the Union a greater advantage in the war.   
If Kentuckians had an undying loyalty to the Union or strong nationalism they 
would have immediately sided with the Union, not proclaimed neutrality and wait. 
Kentuckians would not have protested paying the federal government in taxes to help 
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with the war. Kentucky would have sent more troops willingly to aid the Union’s cause. 
Kentucky did not have a strong sense of nationalism for the Union which is evident in the 
numbers of troops they sent to serve. Out of the eligible white males in Kentucky, only 
twenty-nine percent chose to fight. Seventy-one percent of able men chose not to fight for 
the Union cause. Lincoln made an attempt to draft Kentuckians two different times 
during the war. First, the Federal government called for approximately 9,000 troops, with 
only 421 offering service, while almost 4,000 provided a monetary compensation. 
Unionist sentiment was obviously not powerful enough to encourage Kentuckians to fight 
because in 1864 most eligible men completely dodged the draft. Lincoln’s second attempt 
at calling for Kentucky troops in July, asking for about 16,000 men, gained him fewer 
than 1,500 for actual service. There were about 2,000 substitutes submitted for service to 
the Union.
127
 
Davis seemed to be searching for justification because the Confederacy invaded a 
neutral state.  Enduring the long debate of neutrality, Kentucky remained in the Union 
because that was the best choice for the state.  Kentucky leaders weighed the benefits of 
joining each side.  Kentucky considered the state’s local interests instead of siding with 
southern nationalistic sympathy.  Even with strong secessionist arguments and a 
connection due to the southern slave trade, in the end, the South invaded a neutral 
Kentucky forcing them to seek safety and an alliance with the Union.
128
  
 Kentucky’s unique use of slavery separated them from the southern ideals while 
keeping the state from aligning completely with the Union.  Henry Clay worked tirelessly 
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not only for Kentucky but also the Union. His creation of the American System 
financially aided Kentucky along with several other parts of the country. His goal was 
compromise for the betterment of the Union and he fought many political battles in an 
attempt to keep the nation whole. Political pressure increased during the Secession Crisis 
causing Kentucky to become important to military strategy; however Kentucky politics 
followed Clay’s moderate example as long as possible. It is critical to comprehend the 
long term causes that influenced the reasoning behind Kentucky’s decision in order to 
understand its choice. Kentuckians ultimately sided with the Union because it would 
protect their economy the best. 
 
 Kentucky proved to be of great significance to both the Union and the 
Confederacy during the Civil War.  As stated in chapter two, the state established its 
unique position based on multiple criteria including the diverse native population that 
emigrated from across the country, the proximity of the state to both the north and south 
effectively making it a border state during the Secession Crisis, and the unique form of 
slavery leveraged in Kentucky that distinguished it from other southern states.  Historians 
such as E. Merton Coulter, Thomas D. Clark, Lowell H. Harrison, and James C. Koltter 
trace a detailed history of the state’s foundation through Census data, slave narratives, 
and other primary sources like newspapers of the time.  After taking shape, the state 
joined the turbulent political arena of the nation slowly dividing over the institution of 
slavery. 
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 Chapter three discussed the impact of Henry Clay’s political moderation on 
Kentucky politics. Clay’s American System allowed Kentucky to transport goods such as 
mules, horses, and tobacco more efficiently creating prosperity for the state and 
expanding its involvement with the slave trade. Clay’s role in the Missouri Compromise 
and the Compromise of 1850 demonstrated the value of moderate politics to Kentuckians. 
Thomas C. Mackey, David S. and Jeanne T. Hidler, and Maurice G. Baxter furnished a 
detailed background of Henry Clay while Clay’s papers and his documented speeches 
provided insight towards his convictions that maintaining peace in the union through 
shared compromise would benefit everyone. Clay’s moderate politics established a 
legacy that impacted Kentucky during the secession crisis.   
 The forth chapter examined Clay’s legacy on Kentucky’s politics by tracing the 
political history of the Whig party in Kentucky, the critical election of 1860, the impact 
of the secession crisis on Kentucky, and the inevitable vote for neutrality by the state. 
The election of 1860 sharply divided Kentucky politics between native John C. 
Breckinridge and John Bell of Tennessee. Breckinridge surprisingly lost in his home state 
to Bell who ran on the Unionist ticket and promoted compromise for both the 
preservation of slavery and the Union. This provided political moderation in line with 
Kentucky’s beliefs. When it became clear that the Union would split, Kentucky’s leaders 
debated their state’s future and decided neutrality to be the best course of action as the 
state could prosper without alienating either side. The Louisville Daily Courier and New 
York Times presented insight into opinions of average citizens while records from the 
Kentucky House of Representatives illuminated the position of many Kentucky political 
leaders. Kentucky would stay politically neutral until the military invasion of the 
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Confederacy in September of 1861 would force the state to align with the Union for self-
preservation. 
 Only some historians are in agreement over why Kentucky chose neutrality. 
Author Russell Weigley felt that the mix of Henry Clay’s political legacy and their 
southern heritage neutrality was Kentuckians natural choice. James McPherson agrees 
that Kentucky’s choice of neutrality was the best outcome citizens could hope for and 
that the only “alternative was actual secession.”129 James Rawley presents a complete 
assessment of Kentucky’s situation in stating, “Neutrality was the expression of 
Kentucky’s uniqueness; it was not the outgrowth of timidity.” He believed that 
“neutrality was a wise response to the state’s dilemma and a logical result of her history,” 
Rawley explains the policy “meant an interim victory for the anti-secessionist forces, and 
was perhaps the only course that could keep the state from seceding Neutrality also 
served the short-range political ends of both extremes during a period of agonizing 
incertitude.” The period of neutrality provided Kentucky citizens with a time of reflection 
and allowed the divided state to grow internally and observe unfolding events between 
the Union and Confederacy.
130
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